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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis reviews the dominant opinions within the main
political groupings of West Germany regarding the two major
theater nuclear modernization issues of the recent past
—
enhanced radiation weapons (ERW) and long range theater
nuclear forces (LRTNF) . The broad strategic context of both
the ERW and LRTNF questions sets the scene for exploration
of the major hypothesis: whether differences in the capabil-
ities of proposed new theater nuclear systems are a principal
variable in explaining the positions adopted by each of the
three major political party groupings in West Germany— the
CDU/CSU, the SPD-FDP government, and the left wing of the
SPD. The thesis concludes that weapons characteristics did
influence the government. Characteristics of the political
balance in the West German political system, however, as well
as perceptions of Soviet threat and reliability of American
guarantees to Europe, were also significant.
Indeed, the last year has witnessed dire predictions on
the future of West German-American relations. The ability
of the Atlantic Alliance to maintain itself has been questioned
both in this country and abroad. The West German press has
devoted considerable space to the issue. In February 19 80,
Die Welt reported that "Every time Soviet armies fall on a
weaker neighbor America's Presidents react with indignation...

Every time, too, the Americans fail to attend to prior indica-
tions..." Die Welt added that "calls to goodness" from
American leaders will not defend German borders anymore
effectively than they had those of Afghanistan.
On this side of the Atlantic there is also dissatisfaction,
In April 19 80, Senator Jacob Javits stated that America had
given the Europeans much; it is now time for them to repay
their benefactor. The NATO allies should, he said, take a
much more active part in sanctions against Iran.
Many Europeans, especially some West Germans, however,
are no longer sure the American connection is valuable. The
collapse of CENTO and SEATO, American inability to achieve a
fair bargain in SALT, the apparent slipping of initiative to
the Soviet Union during the period of detente, inconsistent
pursuit of such policies as the human rights campaign, and
the failure of the United States to recognize or respond to
the Soviet military buildup, all chipped away at the credi-
bility of American power.
The debate concerning the relationship between the United
States and the Federal Republic of Germany has been especially
vociferous in the latter country. This is not just because
of the intrinsic importance of the security issue, but also
because critical political stakes are involved for West German
politicians. The elections this past October gave voters a
choice between continuing the Social Democratic-Free Demo-
cratic government run by Helmut Schmidt or electing a

Christian Democratic Union/Christian Socialist Union government
under Franz Josef Strauss. The political stakes were more
complex than simply an electoral campaign between two party
coalitions. Helmut Schmidt had to take into account a power-
ful left wing in his own SPD. Failure to do so could have led
not just to election defeats, but even splits in the party.
All of these issues are made more immediate by the presence
of twenty Soviet divisions on the other side of the intra-German
border. Samuel T. Cohen and W. C. Lyons, two experts on
nuclear weapons, have noted that "The only land area where
NATO and Soviet forces face each other directly is the Euro-
pean theater. This theater, therefore, has become the major
concern of Western strategists and the focal point for tacti-
cal nuclear weapons development and deployment." In other
words, nothing has so concentrated the attention of Western
strategists as the virtual presence of the hangman.
The Soviet Union has also influenced West German economic
policies and politics. Ostpolitik and economic investment
in the East have been practiced by the Federal Republic for
the past decade. Important economic and political ties have
developed between West Germany and the nations of Eastern
Europe in that period of time. The benefits of these ties
have become obvious to virtually every West German citizen.
As a result elements of the SPD have come to believe that the
continuation of detente is essential to the continuation of
SPD electoral success.

Another factor in the debate over West German-American
relations is the problem of American trustworthiness. This
issue is closely related to security considerations. Christoph
Bertram, Director of the International Institute for Strategic
Studies, wrote recently that doubts about American reliability
are inevitable:
...since in the absence of a war that nobody
wants, there is no guarantee that the United
States will indeed use its nuclear weapons
in the pursuit of European security object-
ives. Alliance deterrence, therefore, rests
essentially on political trust, and it is
no more than natural that nuclear hardware
will become an issue when political trust is
wavering.
2
Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Alexander Haig,
adds that without a strong,
forward deployed American presence in Western
Europe, the Allies there will be left with
a complete sense of isolation. This happens
to be the greater danger today and it's not
exclusively the product of the changing stra-
tegic balance. It has to do with the full
range of American credibility and policies.
Friction has been a perennial problem in the Atlantic
Alliance. During the Presidency of Jimmy Carter, however,
difficulties between the Federal Republic and the United
States were especially obvious. Gebhard Schweigler, a member
of the Foundation for Science and Politics near Munich has
written that;
Two themes. . .have determined American foreign
policy, and also the nature of international
politics since the accession to office of
President Carter, detente and human rights.
Indeed, although the Administration sought

to establish new directions on several
international fronts, the sharpest con-
trast to the politics of the Nixon-Ford
Administration was in the area of detente
policies. The tone of the human rights
issue, which was directed at the Soviet
Union, served to heighten international
differences. This not only endangered
East-West rapprochement, but also the
relations between the allies.
^
This disruption of detente has caused some West Germans
to be very nervous about the fragility of detente. Several
members of the Social Democratic Party, for example, have
taken their concern for detente to an extreme, refusing to
have anything to do with East European dissidents or even
Eurocommunists for fear that such contracts would impair their
relations with the Soviet Union. Pierre Hassner wrote recently
in Daedalus that this form of detente,
...shows its fragility and dangers: it
is highly vulnerable both to general
tension and to specific blackmail. It
leads the SPD leaders to be highly reti-
cent toward any changes that risk
destabilizing the Soviet regime... not
only is much of the West German attitude
motivated by the fear of losing or
upsetting Brezhnev and having to face
his more hawkish successors, but it
also involved a negative retrospective
judgement on the Prague Spring, reti-
cence toward East German dissidents...
because they may create trouble for
the Soviet Union and hence have a
destabilizing effect.
^
Josef Joffe, another German political commentator, has




Schmidt is well aware that a new chill in
East-West affairs would tip the electoral
scales in favor of the CDU/CSU. .. Having
staked its fate on detente, the SPD is
condemned to demonstrate its viability over
and over again. There is no denying that
West Germany has become a good deal more
sensitive to Soviet pressures in the past
decade. . .
6
This does not mean, according to Joffe, that the Federal
Republic is entirely to blame. He returns to the problem of
political trust and blames the United States— specifically
the Carter Administration— for failure of leadership.
Theater nuclear weapons modernization issues constitute
perhaps the most important manifestation of the debate over
security and American trustworthiness. These issues have been--
and continue to be—objects of great concern among many Germans
This debate has important implications for the political and
strategic posture of the Federal Republic, NATO and the United
States.
Prior to 1978 the discussion focused on the merits of
enhanced radiation weapons (ERW) . ERW—or "neutron bombs"
—
were strongly supported by those who considered them effective
war-fighting weapons. These writers noted that such weapons,
with limited blast and thus limited collateral damage, would
be easier to use in battle. Usable defensive weapons, it was
argued, would make for the best possible deterrent. Other
commentators thought that enhanced radiation weapons blurred
the 'firebreak' between nuclear and conventional weapons and
therefore made the possibility of nuclear war too great. Some
11

also feared that such weapons would ensure the FRG would be-
come the battleground in a more likely nuclear conflict. The
observers were also concerned that such a weapon would 'de-
couple 1 Europe from US strategic nuclear forces.
In December 1979, NATO decided that the United States
would deploy Pershing 2 MRBMs (with improved guidance and
extended range) and ground launched cruise missiles in Europe
beginning in 1983. These two systems would both have the
capacity to strike the Soviet Union directly. It was decided
to station 572 of these missiles in West Germany, Britain,
Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands. At the same time the
NATO allies promulgated arms control proposals with an offer
to the Soviet Union to negotiate before deployment began. The
decision also involved withdrawal of some 1,000 nuclear war-
heads from Europe once deployment of GLCM and Pershing 2 began.
Proponents of these long-range theater nuclear forces
(LRTNF) saw them as an aid to Western control of the escala-
tory process and as a link to the strategic weapons of the
United States. Some in West Germany opposed the NATO decision
on the grounds that they were the wrong kind of weapons. Among
these commentators were some who thought sea launched cruise
missiles would be preferable. Probably the majority of West
German defense observers believed it was best to emphasize
the arms control aspect of the negotiation. In this way, they
thought detente would not be damaged.
12

The issue of theater nuclear force improvement is thus
central to the political and military relationship between
the United States and the Federal Republic. These political
and military dimensions are closely related. Uwe Nerlich
points out that if NATO does not make a decision on theater
nuclear forces "...which meets strategic requirements, this
may maintain broad domestic support for the alliance, but it
would at the same time display NATO's inability to meet major
7
challenges..." In other words, the deployment of these
weapons is determined by political realities as much by mili-
tary necessity.
The division of Germany, the massive Soviet military pres-
ence, political factors in West Germany, and doubts about the
reliability of the United States as an ally, have all served
to confuse German-American relations. None the less, it is
still clear to most leaders in both countries that security
interests coincide. Both governments have frequently repeated
declarations of loyalty to each other.
Secretary of Defense Brown said in January 19 79 that
g
"Western Europe is of vital interest to the United States."
In the 19 81 Department of Defense Annual Report, Brown noted
that
there can be no doubt that Western Europe
is of vital interest to the United States.
With an aggregate population of 260 million
and GNP of $2 trillion, it is, outside of
North America, the greatest concentration
of economic power in the world. Its
nations, like the United States, are
13

democracies; .. .We have been involved in
European affairs since the foundation of
the Republic; our two greatest wars involved
Europe. We are prepared, if necessary,
to fight in defense of our European allies
again.
^
Similar declarations of partnership with the United States
from Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and Defense Minister Hans Apel
have emphasized that West Germany would not be secure without
its alliance with the United States. Chancellor Schmidt in
April 1978, just after Carter deferred production of ERW, said
in a speech before the Bundestag that "... the framework of the
German-American consensus is unshakable. . .Good German-American
relations were and are one of the most important basis of our
existence as a free community."
Since the United States came of age as an international
power at the beginning of this century, Europe has been im-
portant to American security. The reason for this is simple:
control of that continent by any hegemonic power would con-
stitute a threat not only to the most lucrative of American
markets but also would threaten military and economic lines
of communication. Although Europe would not necessarily be-
come the springboard for direct attack against the United
States, Europe could provide a base from which a strangle-
hold might be applied. As Malcolm Toon, former U.S. Ambassador
to the USSR, put it, the loss of Europe would alter the
balance of power to the point where the United States could





For the United States, Western Europe has
represented not only a vital extension of
the American economic system but also a
bulwark against geopolitical encroachments
on that system by the Soviet Union. For
Western Europe, the United States has been
not only the sole credible source of mil-
itary security, but— notwithstanding
Europe's increasing prosperity— the ultimate
provider of her economic security as well. 12
It is within this context that this study will examine the
two important decisions taken in the NATO alliance on theater
nuclear forces: the April 1978 decision on Enhanced Radiation
Weapons and the December 1979 decision to deploy modernized
Long Range Theater Nuclear Forces. What is under scrutiny
here is the political decision-making process in the Federal
Republic of Germany: what forces at work in West German party
politics influenced the position of the Schmidt government?
The debate both within and between political parties will be
examined in detail. Although the weapons systems that provoked
these poliitcal debates have considerably different military
functions, the political factors involved in deployment de-
cisions were consistent. Issues and essential arguments did
not change substantially over the course of the three year
long debate.
Before a complete analysis of the two debates can occur,
however, it is necessary to outline two important factors:
West German perceptions of the reliability of the United
States and the nature of the Soviet military threat in Europe.
15

II. THE BACKGROUND; AMERICAN RELIABILITY
AND THE SOVIET THEATER NUCLEAR THREAT
The late 1970s— the years of the most recent debate on
theater nuclear weapons—were not years of great consistency
in American foreign policy. A new world balance of forces
became visible to members of the Atlantic alliance. This new
balance brought into clear relief the question of whether the
United States would defend Europe at the risk of its own
security. This section will briefly outline the effect of a
changing correlation of forces on German perceptions. It was
not simply a new correlation of forces, however, that degraded
American reliability. The Carter Administration pursued poli-
cies that often appeared amateurish to Europeans. One example
was the human rights campaign.
On June 6, 1977— the same day the 'neutron bomb' story was
printed in the Washington Post—Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance,
testified before Congress on the upcoming Belgrade Conference.
Vance said,
We seek full implementation of all the
commitments contained in the Helsinki
Final Act. The freer flow of people and
ideas is as important to long-term security
and cooperation as, for example, advance
notice of major military maneuvers; the
humanitarian pledges at Helsinki are as
important as, say, the promises of greater
commercial cooperation.^
On June 9 , in a speech at the Naval Academy commencement,
Vice President Mondale spoke in a similar vein. He said,
16

We cannot teach our children to believe
in human rights and democracy, we cannot
honor those values in our churches and
synagogues and our schools, and then be-
tray those same ideals abroad without
betraying everything we stand for as a
people. !•*
The Soviet Union reacted negatively to such pronouncements.
On June 7 , 1977 TASS said that the Carter Administration had
instigated a "malicious publicity campaign over alleged human
rights violations in the USSR." TASS went on to state that:
The Soviet Union will not tolerate interfer-
ences in its internal affairs by anyone and
under any pretext. Those officials in the
USA who are encouraging anti-Sovietism would
do well to keep in mind that such hullabaloo,
while it will not make socialism budge an inch,
will have an adverse effect on the Soviet- ,
_
American relations and on detente as a whole.
The week before the TASS story, the Soviet government had
announced it was preparing to try Anatoly Shcharansky, a
Jewish computer scientist who had been accused of working for
the CIA.
Carter's stance on human rights lost credibility when he
refused to see Shcharansky ' s wife, Natalya. On June 14, 1977
she was visiting Washington to attend a meeting of the National
Conference on Soviet Jewry. She asked to see President Carter
to talk about her husband's trial. In a news conference on
that day, Carter refused to meet with her, saying "I don't
have any plans to meet Mrs. Shcharansky." He did go on to
say, however, that he had "inquired deeply within the State
Department and within the CIA as to whether or not
17

Mr. Shcharansky has ever had any known relationship in a sub-
16
versive way or otherwise with the CIA. The answer is no."
The human rights campaign was dealt another blow at the
Belgrade Conference. When the Belgrade meeting ended in March
1978, the final document made no reference to human rights.
In fact, the chief of the Soviet delegation, Yuri Vorontsov,
in his parting speech said that although the US had pushed the
human rights issue, Soviet diplomatic skill had prevented US
meddling in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union. Vorontsov
accused American negotiators of preventing the meeting from
dealing with substantive European security issues. He also
said, "Everything indicated that their objective was to lead
the meeting away from the basic questions connected with
furthering the process of detente and strengthening European
.4. ,,17security.
The human rights stand of the Carter Administration caused
great alarm among those West German politicians who wanted to
maintain contacts and detente with the East. Pierre Hassner
wrote recently that,
. . .we cannot avoid being reminded of the
essential ambiguity of the SPD's Ostpolitik
expressed in famous formulas like Egon Bahr's
'change through rapprochement 1 or Willy Brandt's
'in order to change the status quo one has to
accept it. * The essential assumption is that
in order to bring about improvements in the
relations of Communist regimes with other
societies, and with their own, one has to
reassure them, and that, in order to reassure ,
g
them one has to help them stabilize their rule.
18

Clearly, the Carter human rights policy was not reassuring to
the Soviet Union. It was therefore also not reassuring to
many in West Germany. What is more, in the eyes of a good
many Europeans the human rights issue was mainly a device for
creating consensus within the United States. Uwe Nerlich,
Director of Research for the Foundation of Science and Politics
in Munich, pointed out that "With the cynicism of Vietnam and
Watergate still almost fresh in European minds, current mis-
givings now concern the way the human rights campaign is being
19
used to reinvigorate a sense of American destiny."
The human rights issue was just one example— in the opinion
of some West Germans—of a position taken by the United States
that was both dangerous and dangerously inconsistent. Stanley
Hoffman, Chairman of the Center for European Studies at Harvard,
cogently summarized American diplomatic difficulties in this
period as follows:
The Administration. . . threatened to link
trade, or even SALT, to Soviet behavior in
Africa (or trade to Soviet performance on
human rights) while reassuring the Soviets
about the importance of arms control as a
goal in itself. It made of one dissident's
trial a presidential test case and signed
a communique in Belgrade that did not refer
to human rights despite the important pro-
visions of the 1975 Helsinki agreements...
It hardened its line on Euro-communism (thus
continuing in the case of Italy to make the
United States a force in domestic affairs) . .
.
the Administration was very quiet about pro-
Soviet coups in South Yemen and Afghanistan. .
.
it reverted to a far more relaxed attitude
toward Soviet and Cuban activities in Africa. .
.
having introduced the Soviets into the
19

diplomacy of the Arab-Israeli conflict in
September 1977... we carefully kept the
Russians out of the new negotiations that
followed Sadat's initiative and led to
Camp David. 20
For many West Germans this catalogue of confusion and
misdirection compounded a more enduring problem, the fact that
the American commitment to the defense of Europe might ulti-
mately involve the destruction of the United States. Manfred
W5rner, the CDU defense expert and Chairman of the Bundestag
Defense Committee, has written on this issue:
The United States is obviously interested,
in the event of a breakdown of the deter-
rent in Europe, in containing the military
conflict to the Continent as long as possible
—
in keeping it from escalating and prevailing
on the battlefield without endangering
American territory. By contrast, it is in
the European interest that the risk for the
aggressor be heightened by the prospect of
relatively quick escalation of the battle
and its consequent endowment with new quali-
tative and geographical dimensions. 1
This analysis is not unique to Worner; it is commonly held on
both sides of the Atlantic.
Thus, the deployment and build-up of Soviet ICBMs after
19 57 has been critical for the postwar relations between the
United States and its allies. Uwe Nerlich noted:
As Adenauer, for one, recognized instantly,
it would reduce the strategic importance of
NATO for the United States... It put the
American homeland at risk in the protection
of Western Europe, thereby amplifying
existing uncertainties in Western European
dependence on American strategic forces...
In the past, the original objective of
American strategic power had been the
20

protection of allies, with strategic forces
offsetting superior Soviet general-purpose
forces in a 'balance of imbalances. ' 22
This new and changing correlation of forces altered America's
relationship with Europe; fear that the United States would
decouple her strategic forces from those used to help defend
the continent has led to a series of crises. The withdrawal
of France from NATO, for example, was at least partly caused
by the belief that the American strategic guarantee was not
valid. In spite of these fears among allies about American
reliability, the US continued to de-emphasize both strategic
and theater nuclear weapons. To be sure, much of this was the
result of the cost of the Vietnam War. But there was more to
it than just that. Fred C. Ikle, Director of the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency from 19 73 to 19 77, wrote that the
Kennedy Administration embarked on a policy that led to "the
substantial downward trend in total stockpile yield and a
leveling off in missile numbers in the US nuclear arsenal. .
.
What has taken place is a major transformation in the rela-
tionship of military strength between the United States and
23the Soviet Union. . .
"
On the theater level, there has even been a general re-
sistance in the US defense community to full exploitation of
the capabilities of nuclear weapons. The problems surrounding
the deployment of the Davy Crockett provide a case in point.
According to Wolfgang Heisenberg, these weapons
21

. . .would require quite considerable changes
in tactical concepts, equipment and force
deployment which .seemed hardly compatible
with an effective conventional defense, and
so would weaken the option for non-nuclear
warfare. Integration of nuclear battlefield
weapons into the Western forces was therefore
regarded by the then Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara as leading to a dangerous
loss of flexibility and was never implemented.
The Davy Crockett was not deployed on a
sufficiently large scale and was finally
withdrawn in 19 67.24
Major John Rose, in a soon- to-be-published study, demon-
strates that US Army nuclear doctrine was left to stagnate
during the 1960s and that it has yet to be completely renovated:
In the 19 60s when national policy changed
to conventional emphasis, so did the Army.
There was a significant abrupt de-emphasis
in nuclear weapons employment training. .
.
At present, in the 1970s, the situation is
ambivalent. .. the major deficiency in US Army
warfighting doctrine is the absence of 25guidance for nuclear battlefield operations.
It is not just in nuclear doctrine that American forces
have lagged. Acquisition of weapons systems by United States
forces has also fallen behind. Even Secretary of Defense
Harold Brown admits in the 19 81 Annual Report that, although
there is presently essential equivalence,
Longer term stability is not equally assured.
The most immediate source of future instab-
ility is the growing Soviet threat to our
fixed, hard ICBMs. . .within a year or two,
we can expect them to obtain the necessary
combination of ICBM numbers, reliability,
accuracy, and warhead yield to put most of
our MINUTEMAN and TITAN silos at risk from
an attack with a relatively small proportion
of their ICBM force. 26
22

This rather gloomy situation has not been improved by the
amount the United States has spent on defense. Voltaire is
reputed to have remarked once that "God is always on the side
of big battalions." It is a maxim the Soviets have taken to
heart; they have consistently tried to build bigger and better
forces in every military field. In August 19 80 The Economist
reported that the Soviet Union passed the United States in
defense spending in 1971
. . . and the margin has been widening ever
since as Russian outlays have continued to
grow at 3-5% a year in constant prices, while
those of the United States have declined.
By the end of the 1970s, the dollar cost of
Russian military spending was about 50% ~ 7higher than that of the United States...
With all this money, the Soviets have bought themselves a
great deal of new hardware over the last ten years. They have
four new models of ICBMs, a new generation of tanks, several
new models of tactical aircraft, more helicopters than any
other nation, virtually a new navy. More specifically still,
in 1979 alone, the Soviet Union produced: 250 intercontinental
ballistic missiles, 40,000 anti-aircraft missiles, 1,800
combat aircraft, 3,000 tanks, 4,000 armored personnel carriers,
5 major ships and 9 submarines.
A mathematical comparison of warheads, megatonnage, or
numbers of troops does, of course, not tell the whole story.
A large proportion of US strategic delivery systems are
carried by old bombers or submarine- launched ballistic missiles,
The Economist noted that,
23

The bombers have a much smaller chance of
getting through than missiles do and the
submarine missiles are not only much less
accurate than the land-based ones—not
accurate enough to destroy the other side's
missile silos—but also less readily usable
(only about half the American missile sub-
marine fleet is at sea and ready for action
at any given time.) Thus, a tally of 're-
liable and accurate' warheads— those on
land-based ballistic missiles and cruise
missiles gives a sobering second view of
the warhead balance. ^8
Lothar Ruehl, a West German journalist and defense expert,
observed in 19 78 that this increasing disparity in the world-
wide military balance was profoundly altering the European
balance as well. He wrote,
In the past, the function of Soviet medium
and intermediate range delivery systems was
to hold West Europe hostage, so as to off-
set American strategic superiority. Now
that strategic nuclear parity is being
achieved, this now modernized arsenal is no
longer required to balance an American
advantage in the over-all relationship; it
offers instead a separate, and new, Euro-
strategic option. 29
This trend, in which American nuclear weapons and tactical
doctrine have failed to meet the requirements for effective-
battlefield use and in which a new Euro-strategic balance has
developed, has led to considerable uncertainty on the part
of the West German government.
In his 1977 speech before the International Institute for
Strategic Studies, Helmut Schmidt called attention to the
effects of the altered strategic balance. Having deduced that
the strategic, intercontinental nuclear forces of the super-
powers had neutralized each other, he added, that
24

...strategic arms limitations confined to
the United States and the Soviet Union
will inevitably impair the security of the
West European members of the Alliance vis-
a-vis Soviet military superiority in Europe
if we do not succeed in removing the dis-
parities in military power in Europe in
parallel to the SALT negotiations .^0
Schmidt did not mean that Western Europe should engage in a
rapid conventional and theater nuclear force build-up. Instead
he advocated force reduction talks.
It seems clear, then, that the years prior to the December
19 79 decision on LRTNF witnessed a growing belief among some
West German decision makers that the United States and NATO
could no longer deny the Soviet Union some political benefits
derived from its military power. Yet, they often seemed un-
willing to try to reverse detrimental military trends. It is
to an outline of those trends that the second half of this
chapter turns.
A good deal has been written on the conduct of a possible
war in Europe. Imagined scenarios range from long conventional
wars to a theater nuclear struggle that quickly escalates to
intercontinental nuclear war involving the homelands of the
superpowers. One of the major difficulties in writing about
Soviet war-time intentions, however, is the intense secrecy
of the Soviet political and military machines. At least on
certain key issues it is virtually impossible to make state-
ments that go beyond conjecture. Of course, there is an ele-
ment of uncertainty in any calculations of a nation's intentions
25

The Soviet Union, however, has managed to make pronouncements
about its intentions more insecure than usual.
The objective here, therefore, is to outline some thinking
on theater nuclear war that is available from the Soviet Union.
This attempt cannot be definitive. Instead, only a flavor of
Soviet thinking on the subject will be presented.
This section will also present four Western estimates of
the Soviet theater nuclear strength. These estimates were all
written at about the same time and reflect differing percep-
tions of the Soviet theater threat.
The build-up of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe
over the past several years has been recognized by some in the
West. Jacquelyn K. Davis and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. wrote
in 1978 that,
The Soviet Union has been engaged in a mil-
itary build-up which has no parallel for a
major power in peacetime since that of
Nazi Germany in the 19 30s. With an economy
less than half the size of that of the
United States, the Soviet Union has con-
sistently devoted a larger percentage of
its GNP to defense spending than has the
United States. 32
In an interview in February 1978, NATO Secretary General
Joseph Luns said that if the Soviets "take a look at the
power ratio, they need not be afraid, for NATO is incapable
of initiating an offensive." He went on to say, "compared
with the situation 15 to 20 years ago all countries of the
alliance—Germany as well as the United States and France,




The Soviet military build-up seems intended to serve the
political ends of the Soviet government. Many Soviet commen-
tators believe that the only legitimate purpose of military
forces is their political utility. In Marxism Leninism on
War and Army , published in the Soviet Union, it is noted that,
War is the continuation of politics by
violent means. It is an implementation of
politics by armed struggle, and its main
feature. At the same time not all armed
struggle should be considered war. Without
a political aim even the fiercest struggle
will not be war but simply a fight. The
political interests of the classes at war
or their states determine the war aims,
while armed struggle is the means of
achieving these aims. 34
Some Soviet commentators do not exclude any type of war-
fare as a political tool: nuclear weapons are as legitimate
as any other: "...this does not mean that nuclear war... has
ceased to be an instrument of politics, as is claimed by the
overwhelming majority of representatives of pacifist, anti-war
35
movements in the bourgeois world."
The build-up that has brought global reach to the Soviet
military has been well orchestrated. In a 1977 speech General
Alexander Haig said that a
...key characteristic of the expansion of
Soviet military power is its balanced dis-
tribution across all major categories of
capability—nuclear and conventional. .
.
During the past decade, the Soviets have
methodically isolated and addressed force
weaknesses and vulnerabilities which
enabled the West to counterbalance tradi-




The new Soviet military machine has been designed for
offensive action. Soviet writers have consistently emphasized
the value of offensive action. Marshal V.D. Sokolovskiy wrote,
Offensive operations in a future war will
be the basic means for solving the problems
of armed conflict in land theaters of mil-
itary operations. . .The main role in solving
the combat problems of an offensive opera-
tion will be played by operation- tactical
rocket troops and frontal aviation using
nuclear ammunition and also by tank, motor-
ized infantry and airborne troops. 3'
The idea that the Soviets think only in terms of nuclear
conflict is open to serious question. There can be no doubt,
however, that they do consider nuclear warfare a distinct
possibility and that they prepare for it. In the Soviet view
of offensive nuclear war, nuclear weapons seem to be considered
as a sort of super-artillery. This super-artillery is quali-
tatively different, of course, because it can provide support
that is both accurate and highly destructive. V.E. Savkin
wrote in this regard that,
As a result of the wide use of nuclear
weapons both sides will suffer consider-
able losses. Troops which have retained
combat effectiveness will strive to imme-
diately take advantage of the results of
nuclear strikes. Under these conditions
anticipation of attacks by tank and motor-
ized rifle troops often will decide the
outcome of combat... the side which is the
first to begin to exploit these results
will be able to impose its will on the
enemy .38
Thus, on the European battlefield, nuclear weapons would
not be used by the Soviets only to destroy installations,
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transportation or command and control. Such weapons have been
seen by some Soviet military commentators as only one strike
in a phased attack. As such they would be followed by other
strikes
,
probably mounted by ground troops, whose job it would
be either to maintain the initiative or to hold the territory.
Nor do Soviet commentators see nuclear weapons in exactly
the same terms that they view artillery. The idea that nu-
clear weapons have brought about a revolution in the military
art is commonplace in Soviet writings:
Arming troops with nuclear missile weapons
and extensive adoption of radio electronic
devices of various functions caused a revo-
lution in military affairs. It was necessary
to revise the organizational structure of
troops and control entities and to elaborate
an entire system of measures to ensure pro-
tection of personnel, control facilities and
equipment from mass destruction weapons.^
It seems, however, that this revolution has been interpreted
in the light of traditional Russian military thought. Much of
that thought has been impressed with the value of artillery
to offensive operations. For them, therefore, it makes a good
deal of sense that nuclear weapons provide more effective and
powerful ground support.
Savkin's writings clearly indicate two things about the
use of nuclear weapons in the European theater: first, sur-
prise is considered very valuable; second, when nuclear weapons
are used, employment should be massive. Major General Korzun,
a Candidate in Military Science, expressed the same view:
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While paying great attention to the sur-
prise factor, Soviet military art... never
made a fetish of it. It considers that to
achieve victory in military operations,
besides surprise it is necessary to observe
other most important principles of military
art, to take into account the real correla-
tion of forces of the sides and... create
the necessary superiority in manpower and
equipment. . . ^0
These doctrinal imperatives led the Soviet Union to develop
a more accurate generation of long-range theater weapons. In
19 75, deployment of Backfire bombers began. These were to
supplement and eventually replace the Badger and Blinder air-
craft. According to the 1979 Defense White Paper of the Federal
Republic, by the spring of 1979 approximately 80 Backfires had
been deployed with a deployment rate of approximately 30 per
41year. In 1976 deployment of the SS-20 missile commenced.
This new weapon system was deployed as a supplement to other
MRBM/IRBM, the SS-4 and SS-5—of which there were approximately
500. The SS-20 is a mobile system and delivers three warheads
with great accuracy. Each mobile launcher is equipped with
three or four reloadable missiles. Reports on the number of
SS-20s deployed by 1979 vary widely, but the Federal Republic
officially set the figure at 100 in the spring of 1979 with an
42
annual deployment rate of 50 launchers.
It is important to note that these new Soviet weapons
—
especially the SS-20 are more valuable as battlefield weapons
than the older theater nuclear forces. Better accuracy and
lower vulnerability mean that follow-on airmobile or airborne
30

landings would be easier. They also would be less likely to
cause collateral damage that might diminish the speed of a
breakthrough
.
The final section of this chapter will examine several
different assessments of the theater nuclear balance in Europe.
Only weapon systems with a range greater than one thousand
kilometers have been included so that an accurate comparison
can be made between these different assessments. Each of these
calculations varies in its assumptions and therefore also in
its results. Two of these assessments were produced by members
of the SPD and CDU. Although their estimates are not officially
endorsed by their parties, they do seem to reflect the approach
of the respective political factions. These two studies are
that of Paul Neumann, Chairman of the Arbeitsgruppe 1
, a com-
mittee serving the SPD parliamentary group; the second was
compiled by Wolfgang Pordzik of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation
in Bonn, an organization associated with the CDU. The other
two calculations are those of the International Institute for
Strategic Studies, and that published by Secretary of Defense
43Brown in the 19 81 Annual Report.
The IISS estimate of the theater nuclear balance makes
several assumptions that are questionable in both logic and
consistency. Some of these questionable assumptions are also
applicable to all four estimates. The most important of these
common false assumptions seems to be that payload and mega-
tonnage are not significant. The IISS— the only one to
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explicitly state its assumptions—declared that "It has not
been thought useful to assess total yields, throw weight, or
bomber pay loads. . .Total deliverable megatonnage is not considered
44
to be very significant." This is not true: yield has con-
siderable significance for the type of target that can be
destroyed. It is, however, easier to count launchers than it
is to assess the significance of megatonnage. All of the
analysts reviewed here have adopted the launcher measure. It
is important to recognize that this only measures one dimension
of the problem.
All of these estimates of the theater nuclear balance
except Secretary Brown's, assume that some central US systems
— SLBMS—will be dedicated to the European theater. This is
not an unnatural assumption since it is part of American declara-
tory policy that some SLBMs have been allotted to SACEUR.
The IISS writes, however, that the number of Poseidon war-
heads allocated to SACEUR is arbitrary and could be raised
without difficulty. In a non-sequitur the IISS therefore
decided that it would not be necessary to count SS-20 reloads.
Of the four estimates only the SPD ' s includes reload capability.
In fact, of course, a crisis might just as easily cause American
decision makers to hold back SLBM rather than allocate more
to Europe.
Another questionable assumption can be found in these
balances. That is that no Soviet naval air forces or cruise
missiles will be used against land targets. The IISS study,
32

however, includes half of the aircraft on two US carriers as
being capable of attacking Warsaw Pact territory.
The IISS also includes half of the total US FB 111 A in
the theater balance even though they are stationed in the
United States. These aircraft, however, are under the control
of SAC. Once again, it is unlikely that SAC would be anxious
to release them for theater missions in the event of hostili-
ties.
The IISS estimates that one quarter of nuclear-capable
ground attack aircraft in the Warsaw Pact will be allocated
to the nuclear role. The IISS estimate allocates one third
of NATO ground attack aircraft to this role. No explanation
is given for this difference of proportion that increases the
nuclear capability of the NATO side.
One difference between these estimates must be noted: The
ISS subtracts a variable proportion of the total available
warheads from that total to arrive at the "current balance of
usable warheads." Theirs is the only assessment to do so.
These assumptions—especially those made by the IISS
—
seem to skew the theater nuclear balance toward higher results
on the NATO side than should actually be the case. On the
other hand, since the United States does not in any way account
for French systems, some nuclear-capable aircraft or SLBM,
the Annual Report 1981 figures are also open to dispute. The












co iH -P +J
n3 XJ •H •H
rd rd 3 5d) rH *—
'
£ -H
5-1 (d o O O r~- o o o ro o o o
<T$ > V£> CTi cn ro o o m ^ rlLIO









































O O O O
o o o in
in ro in *y
o o o o





S *«X g ^ s e
co ^ 1 X ^
X CD o o o O O O O o o o o o o
w tr> o o o O O 00 o o o o o r^ o
Eh c CN rH CN CN <7\ CN (J\ ro ^ in "3* •^ «*
CO rcj »* % % *b «k ** •« ^ ^ ^ ^ «. < %







5-1 CO CO CO
CO CN
1 COS CO Q Dfd CO Q D CO Q D CO CO CO Q DO
< C^ HOtQ CO H CU Q CO O H CU Q CO H a. a co
CO CD in H CO CJ D ^r H CO U D CN H CO U D O CO H CO U D
« 4J Eh CQ













03 rH H in
T3 .Q a 00
fd fd <u a\
CD H •a H£ H 1
P. fd 00 00 00 ^ ^ ^ CN ^r
rd > o o o ko vo isO CO










*-> en Cm CD
•a T3 ,Q
+j flj •r.
c <D 2 V£ S U CD
P a) rJ >i
*""'
-p
en rH rH iH H H H I H en
cn >i P a C
2 5-4 en CQ CD fd
w CD T3 H
Eh £ Cu a.W £ CD




H ,—, .—» .—
.
cn CD
cn O o CN T3 -a cn







Q -p 00 CO 00 ^* ^J* ^* Eh CD CD
z c O O O ^O ^O V£> < ^ CO 00 o P a cs
< <d H rH rH ^* "31 ^f Z iH H H X >-l •HJ > CD CD P
c -P T3
H rd P en CD





M < o a CD enJ &H Eh CN •H U CD
111 o U CO id cn-P














cu O O O o o o < O o O o rC O rH
en O O O o o o 2 cn ^r o TT cx> -P H c
c O CO O o m o W OS y& U3 O CTi c a
id Ml *fe >fe fc ^ % H rtj «. fd C M-l s











* Q c cn'O cn h
CN w •H C <D u





CO en <U cn X! 3 U -H
en Q D en a d CQ a cn H c
Cn H cm q cn K H 04 q en u M O CD -P
cu H WUD 2 H en u D Q cn 3 CD C P
4J
u
U 2 cn Q D en Cm •H Pm C
rd J
a
H Cm Q cn -H









M « ^o o
(d > r- vo
2 < ro in
o o o CO o ^ O O O










































o o o o




S S e fo £ s e s S
CO .* 5 r* 1 J2 ,* X X ,2
a <u o o o o o o o o o o O
w C7> o o o o o o o o o o o
En C o CN O CO rH o ^D CN in CN MD
CO rtj a. rij •. rtj *. •* ^ ^ 1* ^ «b ffe ^







Eh 0) T3 <D «w rH
u C7> a O ,* &>
< T3 •H C rd
Cm >i d rH <0 rd 0)
M 03 C/ cd 03 CO PM COO 03 CO 03 coo u
2 CO Q D«3 CO Q D CO Q DO CO Q D CO Q DO
< CT> vo H Cm q CO CN H 04 Q CO CXi H cu Q CO CN H Cm Q CO CO H Cm Q CO
CO CD rH H CO CJ D CN H CO U D rH H CO U D CN h co rj d CN H CO U D
« -P






s-i ro CN 00 CO «^5
in ^r <g< m






























< <2 2 m 2 2 CN
I
ro CN 2 CN
S
H >1Q uW
s p CO CO CO VD ro r- ro CTi "J* CN CN VO O
c rr ^j< ^ in ro ro ro CT> CN CN in in r-

















































C CO Q D CD 03 Q D





















H Q DOPm Q CO
CO U D
<D T3 -P














































































CU O o o O
Cr> o o o o
C ^ CX< m cn m
rd •fc ^ H - ^




a ^ H <
w •H
Eh fa < Ljj
cn >1 in
>H n COO U COO coo o U fa coo O
cn CO Q DO 5-1 CD CO Q DO <D kO CO Q DO
CT> •^* H CU Q CO rd H Cm Q CO CT>H Cu Q CO •H H CU Q COO CU o H CO CJ D 3 H CO CJ D fd H CQ CJ D 5q <C H CO U D
Eh -p rH CP 5h Jh





































Ei o o o O
OS 5 «=r CO iH V£>
































CM ^ CN CN <* *






















































































«• <c * %H2H 00
CO
CO Q DO
m H ft Q CO















o o o o
o o o o
ro ro m m
+ < ^ -< -




•H CO Q DO CO Q DO
M H ft Q CO A H ft Q CO










S-i to o o o
rd > o o o






































4J o <* o















CO T3 CO Q D u
C7» •rH H CU Q CO















































































































o ^D -P «£> 00
<J\ cr* <^>








00 r- VD iH co
rH en in rH CO






























o o CO CO







<: 25 03 O
rtj 03
CO Q a
« z OS 03


















































































These estimates make clear one point about the theater
nuclear balance: there is little agreement on how that balance
should be calculated. There is not even agreement on what
weapons systems are to be included. It is thus very diffi-
cult to make an accurate judgement of the actual balance.
These figures do show, some of the difficulties in the
concept of a 'balance'. It is simply not possible to produce
a completely objective system that reveals where one military
force stands in relation to another. In other words, if a
military mission can be said to have two components— fire-
power and maneuver— then the ability to carry out that mission
cannot be judged by inventorying only the firepower component.
Michael Howard has noted that "The belief that technology has
somehow eliminated the need for operational effectiveness is,
in short, no more likely to be valid in the nuclear age than
45 .it was in the Second World War." What is important is not
just the raw numbers of TNF but how they would be used in the
operational environment.
As will be seen, this employment, or maneuver, dimension
of TNF was often overlooked in the debates on ERW and LRTNF.
Decision-makers often concentrated on the static firepower
balance charted in tables. Both politicians and the military
in the councils of NATO often seemed to have been more con-
cerned with political issues and with redressing the impression
of imbalance in Europe than they were with establishing




This, then, was the political and military milieu in which
the Federal Republic operated during the ERW and LRTNF decisions
Fears in the Federal Republic grew that strategic parity would
sever the American tie to Europe. Some commentators in West
Germany even raised the specter of Tauroggen and Rapallo,
suggesting that Germany had historically been forced to look
East when it could no longer depend on the West. At the same
time the continued Soviet theater build-up and offensive
orientation also contributed to insecurity among political
observers in the Federal Republic.
Although nuclear weapons have been stationed in West
Germany since the 19 50s, they are in need of modernization.
By the late 1970s the time for a debate both in the United
States and West Germany on theater nuclear weapons had come.
It is to a more thorough examination of that debate and the
West German political decision making process on the issue
that this paper now turns.
44

III. THE ENHANCED RADIATION WARHEAD DECISION
The public debate on enhanced radiation weapons for Europe
began on June 6, 19 77 when Walter Pincus of the Washington Post
published a story entitled "Neutron Killer Warhead Buried in
ERDA Budget." He wrote that "The United States is about to
begin production of its first nuclear battlefield weapon that
specifically is designed to kill people rather than to destroy
46
military installations through heat and blast." The weapon
quickly became a matter for debate in West Germany as well.
In July 1977 Egon Bahr, Special Minister in the government of
the Federal Republic and a powerful figure in the Social Demo-
cratic Party, wrote in the party newspaper that the 'neutron
bomb 1 raised the question of "whether it will become a principle
of thought and action that material goods are more valuable
than humanity." He concluded that a weapon that preserved
47goods but destroyed men was a "symbol of mental perversion."
The opening of the public debate was not, however, the
beginning of the development of enhanced radiation weaponry.
In fact, the concept was first developed in the late 19 50's by
Samuel T. Cohen while he was working to reduce fall-out in
atomic weapons. The ER warhead eventually developed achieved
its destructive power from the prompt production of high-energy
neutrons. This phenomenon occurs in all thermo-nuclear reac-
tions, but is proportionally higher in ER weapons. The radius
45

of the radiation effect is increased and casualties are caused
more by radiation than by blast or heat. The Carter Adminis-
tration's "Arms Control Impact Analysis" put it this way:
"For example, a 1 KT ER Warhead gives the same approximate
damage expectancy of tank crew incapacitation through radiation
effects as a 10KT fission warhead does through radiation
48
effects." Put simply, the amount of energy that contributes
to blast and heat effects is minimized while the amount of
energy used to produce radiation is maximized.
The first test of an enhanced radiation warhead took place
in 1963. Although first projected for deployment in the Sprint
anti-ballistic missile system, it was recognized as early as
the late 19 50s that the system would be useful in the defense
of Europe. At the same time the weapon would cause less phys-
ical war damage than older generations of nuclear arms. James
Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense in 1973, and General Alexander
Haig, SACEUR in 1975, were both concerned with the ability of
NATO to defend the continent. Haig stated, "I recall arriving
in Europe... and finding a situation in which there was very
little concern about the nature and character of the relentless
49growth of Soviet and Warsaw Pact military power." Schlesinger
too, was interested in new methods of dealing with the Warsaw
Pact. In March 1974 he hinted at the possibility of ER war-
heads for Europe when he stated that there were "serious
possibilities of replacing the existing tactical nuclear stock-
pile with nuclear weapons and systems more appropriate."
46

In June 1974, the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) of NATO
conducted one of its bi-annual meetings in Bergen, Norway.
This group is composed of the defense ministers from eight
NATO countries. There are four permanent members from the
United States, Britain, West Germany, and Italy. In addition,
there are four members from other NATO countries—except France
and Iceland—attending on a rotating basis.
At the Bergen NPG meeting, the United States introduced
what were called "Enhanced Radiation, Reduced Blast" warheads
as a possible solution to some of the battlefield problems of
NATO commanders. Throughout 1975 and 19 76, the United States
provided the NPG information on the ER warhead and possible
deployment configurations. By the end of 19 76, agreement had
been reached among the NATO allies to produce ER warheads for
the 155mm and 8 inch howitzers and for the Lance missile.
The Lance is a short range missile with a simplified inertial
guidance system. It has a maximum range of approximately 70
miles.
It was just before the June 19 77 meeting of the NPG that
Walter Pincus broke his story on 'Killer Warheads*. Throughout
June, Pincus continued to publish articles on the issue. He
accused the Pentagon of attempting to slip production of the
weapon into the budget without the knowledge of the President
52
and Congress. Congress quickly divided over the issue.
Senator John S tennis thought the weapon was "the best news I
have heard in years." Senator Mark Hatfield however, was
47

incensed: "We discovered that it was in the budget. We dis-
covered that no President had ever approved it. This whole
thing was stumbled into our life. . .My ultimate hope is that
53this weapon never enters the arsenal." Although unwilling
at this time to commit itself firmly to production and deploy-
ment of ER weapons, the Carter Administration was certainly
leaning in that direction. On July 11, 1977, President Carter
sent a letter to Senator Stennis saying:
I have requested that the Department of
Defense provide me a study of such weaponry
by August 15, 1977; it will be accompanied by
an Arms Control Impact Statement (ACIS) . I
intend to make a final production decision
shortly after receiving these two documents...
It is my present view that the enhanced radia-
tion weapon contained in the ERDA budget is
in this Nation's security interest. I there-
fore urge Congress to approve the current
funding request. ^
4
This position, however, was already a step back from a decision
to deploy ER weapons that had virtually been reached. Until
June of 19 77 there seems to have been little if any opposition
from the members of the NPG to ER production and deployment.
Yet Carter guaranteed that the issue would become controversial
by demanding that NATO members, especially the FRG, agree
publicly to deployment prior to the beginning of production.
This move, no doubt, was domestically expedient since the
Administration could point out that it was sharing the respon-
sibility for ER weapons with its NATO partner. But this attempt
to share responsibility meant that the issue would automatic-
ally become extremely sensitive in West German politics. This
48

sort of move was likely to conjure up images of Europe decoupled
from the American strategic guarantee in the minds of many
German politicians.
The reaction in the Federal Republic of Germany to the
sudden bursting of the 'neutron bomb 1 issue was sometimes ex-
treme. Egon Bahr's declaration that the weapon was morally
perverse has already been mentioned. A number of SPD members
agreed. Others, from the Christian Democratic Union/Christian
Socialist Union— notably Manfred Worner, the Chairman of the
Defense Committee in the Bundestag—welcomed ER weapons as a
counter to Soviet forces in Europe.
The Schmidt government seems to have taken its cue from
the Carter Administration. Schmidt, too, refused to accept
responsibility for the ER decision. Deciding to remain aloof
on the issue, he stated that the Federal Republic would con-
sider deployment on West German territory only after the
United States had put the weapon into production.
On October 12, 19 77 the NPG concluded another meeting,
this time held in Bari, Italy. The results of the meeting
were confused at best. Although a number of NATO leaders were
convinced that ER weapons were the proper response to Soviet
theater superiority, they were unwilling to take the political
risks involved in deployment. The Associated Press reported
that a senior NATO official "...warned against renouncing the
neutron weapon, saying that it was needed to 'provide bal-
ancing capability' against the Soviet Union. But politically,
49

no nation supported deployment of the neutron bomb in Europe,
55partly because of growing leftist opposition to the weapon."
West German Defense Minister Georg Leber refused to make any
comment on ER deployment. Harold Brown indicated that the
United States would' continue to "sound out" its allies on the
issue.
From November 15 to 19, 1977 the SPD held a convention in
Hamburg. The ER issue was the one of the most divisive on the
agenda. The left wing of the Party was vehemently against
deployment of the weapon on West German soil. They presented
a resolution calling for a complete prohibition of the neutron
warhead on the territory of the Federal Republic. The resol-
ution read,
The Social Democratic Party of Germany will
not permit the stationing of neutron warheads
on the territory of the Federal Republic of
Germany. At this early state of the political
and military discussion on these new weapons
of mass destruction the Party takes the opportun-
ity to prevent imminent danger to the German
People. -^
In the end a somewhat less strident approach prevailed.
The final form of the resolution called on the Federal Govern-
ment to keep in mind that,
During a decision on the deployment of quali-
tatively new weapons, it is essential that
their procurement does not hinder arms control
negotiations. . .The government of the Federal
Republic should use its influence to reduce
continued technical development of atomic
weapons that point the way to a reduction of
the nuclear threshold. *7
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Some thought that the passage of this resolution gave the
Schmidt government new room for maneuver. In fact, however,
the left wing of the party had made it clear that they took a
very dim view of new developments in nuclear technology. To
be sure, the resolution that was passed did keep the door to
ERW open—but at best only a crack. Schmidt could not cate-
gorically support ERW in public: to do so would have seriously
divided the party.
There was no such hesitation on the part of the Soviet
Union and the German Democratic Republic on the issue of
Enhanced Radiation weapons. They quickly moved to take advan-
tage of the situation. In December 1977, the West German news
magazine Per Spiegel published a manifesto purported to have
been written by dissidents in the GDR. In retaliation, the
GDR closed down the East Berlin office of Der Spiegel. In
January 1978, East German border guards refused entry to East
Berlin of a number of CDU/CSU Bundestag deputies because "their
58
visit to the GDR is not desirable at present."
These actions by the East Germans, along with a number of
expressions of displeasure from the Soviet Union served— if
not intentionally, at least in effect— to cloud the ERW issue.
Helmut Kohl, head of the Christian Democratic Union called for
retaliatory measures against the GDR. He was reported to have
stated that the Federal Government should be clear in its
59
attitude on such matters and not be continually caught napping.
Egon Bahr, a leader in the SPD left wing, discounted the
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authenticity of the manifesto and stated; "I think the GDR
believed it has reason to react harshly to the Per Spiegel
publication. . . " He also thought that the GDR would not ulti-
mately endanger detente because "...in that case the GDR
6
would really have to become culpable for breach of contract."
For his part, Chancellor Schmidt reacted with caution. Con-
cerning the refusals to allow CDU delegates into East Berlin,
he stated, "We do not understand these refusals. For this
reason we have protested. On the other hand, we must not
6
1
retaliate in the same vein."
Whether or not the Soviet Union and the GDR intended their
actions specifically to have an effect on the Federal Govern-
ment's decisions concerning ERW, they did prove that detente
in Germany was very fragile. These sorts of moves hinted that
the 'human contracts'— the new freedom of movement—between
East and West Germany established in the early years of Ents-
pannungspolitik were subject to modification by the East. If
the Per Spiegel manifesto or speeches by the CDU/CSU in the
Bundestag resulted in a constriction of the pipeline between
East and West Germany, it is clear that the effects of ERW
deployment would be even more severe.
On January 23, 1978 Die Welt , a Hamburg newspaper, reported
that Soviet Party Secretary Brezhnev had sent a letter to
several NATO governments warning the West against introducing




While Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich
Genscher and Defense Minister George
Leber continue to deem the weapon system
indispensable because of the deterrence
capability for the Western Alliance,
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has lately been
increasingly inclined to follow the
opinion of the SPD majority not to allow
any neutron warheads on West German soil.
This was in spite of pressure from the Carter Adminis-
tration to approve deployment. Per Spiegel continued:
Washington, which is making its decision
on the serial production of the new weapon
dependent on the vote of its West European
allies, has been increasing its pressure
in Bonn since the Federal Government, in
its opinion, should make it clear at long
last whether it wants to yield to the
pressure of Moscow, or whether it continues
to stay firmly on the side of the United
States. A high ranking ministry official
said bitterly; 'Now we can no longer make
a free decision. '° 2
On February 3, 19 78, Defense Minister Leber resigned as
the result of a wiretapping episode involving Military Intel-
ligence. Leber was succeeded by the Finance Minister Hans
Apel. Apel's views on the ER warhead issue seemed to coin-
cide more with those of Schmidt than had Leber's.
The CDU/CSU Bundestag faction voted on February 21, 19 78
to support production and deployment of ER weapons in Europe.
According to reports the faction stated that "It is the FRG's
moral and political duty to secure peace. This includes pre-
venting war by means of a credible deterrent. The neutron
63bomb increases deterrence..."
Chancellor Schmidt was not influenced by the CDU/CSU call
for action on ERW. In a statement issued on February 23, 1978,
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he declared that the decision to produce the weapons was up
to the United States. He also declared that the deployment
of such weapons must be preceded by intensive efforts to
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secure arms control agreements. Christoph Bertram, the head
of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and a
West German citizen, wrote in 1979 that Schmidt's objective
was to avoid responsibility for the ER decision both because
of domestic politics and to preserve detente:
Bonn wanted Washington— as in the past— to
shoulder the responsibility for the pro-
duction decision while reserving for itself
the right to introduce the matter into
current East-West arms control negotiations
—
both to reduce political controversy at
home and to demonstrate detente credibility
toward the East. Moreover, when it became
clear that the United States insisted on a
positive German response to the deployment
decision, the Federal Government made its
own agreement contingent upon the consent
of one other West European state to station
the new weapon on its soil—although the
neutron weapon would make little military
sense if deployed far in the rear of the
prospective battle zone. ^
5
Several sources report that Schmidt's hesitant public
position was less reserved in private. The Economist and
The Washington Post reported in March and April that Bonn had
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sent quiet signals to Washington. The Carter Administration
seems, however, to have been willing to accept only public
assurances that ER weapons would be deployed in NATO. Carter
decided on the weekend of 18-19 March— when public assurances
from NATO were clearly not in the offing— to cancel completely
the production of ER warheads for Europe. He sent Deputy of
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Secretary of State Warren Christopher to NATO capitals to in-
form the governments of his decision. When Schmidt heard the
news, he was taken by surprise. He was so shocked, in fact,
that he asked Christopher to confirm the message with Carter,
who was then travelling in Brazil. It took until the next
day, March 31, for Christopher to contact Carter; the decision
stood. Schmidt told Christopher on the spot that the Federal
Government now stood prepared to support deployment in Europe
of ERW. The Federal Government was so concerned that it dis-
patched Foreign Minister Genscher to Washington on April 4.
He urged the Carter Administration to go ahead with production
and promised that, if the Soviets did not reciprocate in arms
control negotiations, the Federal Republic would publicly
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support deployment in Europe.
Although this did not change Carter's mind completely, he
did modify slightly his decision; instead of eliminating the
production of ERW, he decided to 'defer' production. On April
7, 1978, he announced:
I have decided to defer production of
weapons with enhanced radiation effects.
The ultimate decision regarding the in-
corporation of enhanced radiation features
into our modernized battlefield weapons
will be made later, and will be influenced
by the degree to which the Soviet Union
shows restraint in its conventional and
nuclear arms programs and force deployments
affecting the security of the United
States and Western Europe. .
.
The United States is consulting with its
partners in the North Atlantic Alliance
on this decision and will continue to
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discuss with them appropriate arms-
control measures to be pursued with
the Soviet Union. 68
This put the Schmidt government in a difficult situation.
On one hand, it opened Schmidt to attacks from the CDU/CSU.
Helmut Kohl lost no time in launching them. The Times of
London reported that "Herr Helmut Kohl... said today the
Chancellor himself was partly to blame for what he called
the 'dramatic deterioration' in German-American relations.
Herr Schmidt had not dared to make the German position public
69for fear of upsetting the left wing of his party..." On
the other hand, because Schmidt appeared to have supported
ERW deployment in the FRG he was also open to criticism from
that very left wing.
On April 18 and 19, while anti-neutron bomb demonstrations
were held outside, the Nuclear Planning Group met at the Danish
naval base at Fredrikshavn. They issued a communique stating
that future developments on ERW were dependent on Soviet
action. They recognized that,
. . . the option of introducing enhanced
radiation capability (neutron) in these
systems would be influenced by the degree
to which the Soviet Union shows restraint
in its conventional theater nuclear arms
programs and force deployments affecting
the security of NATO. 70
They also agreed that modernization of NATO's nuclear forces
was critical, "including the steps underway in the United
States to modernize the Lance and eight- inch artillery systems."
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On April 25, 1978, Brezhnev responded to these half-heated
moves in NATO. In a speech before the 18th Congress of the
Young Communist League, he said that Carter's deferral of a
final decision on ERW was "at best a half measure. But I can
inform you that we have taken the President's statement into
account and that we, too, will not begin production of neutron
arms so long as the United States does not do so." Brezhnev
also claimed in this speech that the Soviet Union had not
increased its forces in the European theater for ten years.
In November, Brezhnev told a group of US Senators visiting in
Moscow that Soviet designers had already tested a neutron
bomb but gave it up.
With Brezhnev's November pronouncements the Enhanced
Radiation Warhead episode drifted to a close—at least for
the time being. This synopsis of the events surrounding
Carter's decision to 'defer' production of enhanced radiation
weapons reveals some important points. First, the Carter
Administration did appear to be unwilling to accept sole
responsibility for the ERW decision. Even private assurances
of support from West German leaders and widespread support
within the councils of NATO were not enough for the President.
The Carter stance undoubtedly contributed to difficulties in
the relationship between the United States and the Federal
Republic because it seemed to be completely oblivious to the
second major factor: the political situation within the
ruling coalition in the West German government. This overview
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has pointed out some of the difficulties facing Schmidt on
the ERW issue. The section that follows will examine in
considerably more detail the debates in the Federal Republic
of Germany on the issue.
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IV. THE ERW DEBATE IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
In April, 1977 a staff report for the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations stated that:
The European NATO members have traditionally
considered theater nuclear forces... a key
connection between the conventional forces
and the United States' strategic deterrent.
Because of this, the Europeans are less inter-
ested in battlefield weapons. . .but rather
favor longer-range systems capable of either
delivering strategic strikes. . .or. .. of extending
the battle beyond the immediate battlefield. ^2
Although this analysis contains an element of truth, the West
German debate over the enhanced radiation warhead was con-
siderably more complex than the staff report indicates.
This section will outline in some detail the views on ERW
of the major groups in West German politics. The primary
spokesman of the CDU/CSU opposition was the Chairman of the
Bundestag Defense Committee, Manfred Wttrner. The second group
the left wing of the SPD - had as its most prominent ERW spokes-
man Egon Bahr, a. member of the SPD who held positions in both
the party and as Special Minister in the government. The
third and last group was the SPD-FDP government itself. Helmut
Schmidt and the FDP spokesman on defense matters, Jlirgen
Mollemann, enunciated the coalition's position on ERW.
This chapter will analyse the impact of these three poli-
tical groups on the actions of the Schmidt government. It will
be suggested that Schmidt's government could openly support
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ERW only at the risk of internal party cohesion. Schmidt,
therefore, attempted to keep party and coalition together by
balancing the left wing and the FDP with each other. In other
words, the mechanics of internal party politics determined
Schmidt's external position on ERW.
In the Fall 1977 issue of Strategic Review , Manfred Worner
published one of the most comprehensive statements on theater
nuclear weapons issued by a West German politician. In it
he complained that NATO does not have an adequate strategy for
the TNW it already has:
"serious consideration of the actual use
of these weapons—and of its possible con-
sequences— tends to be smothered under a
psychological blanket. . .There is the belief,
on the one hand, that TNW contributed to
the securing of the peace—but the fear on
the other hand, that a future conflict in
Europe would mean inexorably the nuclear




Worner argued that serious examination of the nature of
nuclear arms is necessary because the military threat from
the Soviet Union has been growing. In an interview in Feb-
ruary 1978 he said, "It is indisputable that the Soviet Union
in the past years systematically developed its superiority
in Europe vis-a-vis us, particularly in the sector of con-
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ventional arms, medium-range missiles and tanks." He also
asserted that a Soviet move into Western Europe would be
characterized by an attempt to destroy Allied forces "through
the sudden deployment, striking power and speedy advance of
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substantially superior and tightly coordinated forces... If
large scale resistance should. . .be encountered, the offensive
must be sustained through the sheer weight and momentum of
superior forces..." On whether or not such an offensive would
include nuclear weapons, Worner wrote,
...traditionally Soviet strategists have
not been enticed by the notion of a ' fire-
break 1 between conventional and nuclear
conflict. .
.
[however] the trend of improve-
ments ... could be interpreted to mean that
a higher probability is being attached to
a conventional conflict without escalation.
Nevertheless, the equipment and training of
Warsaw Pact forces, as well as prevailing
Soviet military doctrine, continues to
emphasize the concept of a fully inte-
7
_
grated conventional and nuclear offensive.
Worner, then, believed that Soviet power on both the nu-
clear and the conventional levels was growing rapidly in the
European theater. Yet, he found Europeans, and especially
West Germans, unable to make an appropriate response. During
the debates in the Bundestag on the ERW issue in September
1977 he said,
...two basic conditions, which many in the
populace and also many politicians overlook,
are:
First, Europe is not in a position to bal-
ance the military power the USSR brings to
bear against it and therefore remains for
some time dependent on the nuclear pro-
tection of an extra-European power, speci-
fically the United States; and this at a
time in which the nuclear parity of the
superpowers can be expected to put the
existence of that state. . .which employs
nuclear weapons at risk.
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The Second basic condition: Europe is
evidently neither ready nor willing to
adjust the conventional inferiority vis-
a^-vis the Warsaw Pact, and remains
dependent on the threat of the first
use of nuclear weapons. ^
In spite of this need for nuclear weapons in Europe Worner
contended that the Europeans have evaded discussion of a
rational doctrine for their employment. He accused them of
"blinking their eyes and contending that tactical nuclear
weapons are useful only for deterrence but not for the potential
battlefield. . . Anyone who weighs the deterrent effect of
tactical nuclear weapons. .. cannot do so in isolation of a
77
realistic. .. doctrine regarding their actual use in combat."
In other words, he said effective deterrence is inescapably
tied to the willingness of NATO nations to suffer significant
damage. The greater the capacity to absorb destruction the
more effective the deterrent.
Worner 's prescription in this situation was (and remains)
to use TNW within the frame work of the NATO doctrine of
flexible response. He wrote;
...it is essential that publicity be given
—
through declaratory policies as well as
visible deployments — to the roles that
NATO has assigned to tactical nuclear
weapons, namely:
(1) To deter the Warsaw Pact from conven-
tional aggression against Western Europe
and, if necessary, to blunt such aggression.
(2) To deter the Warsaw Pact from the use
of tactical nuclear weapons and, if neces-
sary, to respond at the same level.
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(3) To signal to the Warsaw Pact that
the United States is willing to accept
the risk of escalation in the defense
of Europe, and is prepared even to re-
sort to strategic nuclear weapons in
that defense. "?°
During the Bundestag debates, too, Worner was an advocate
of flexible response and the ability to escalate if necessary.
He said,
The tactical nuclear weapons form an
irreplacable essential part of our
deterrence and defense landscape.
They are— not alone but an essential
part of— that which makes escalation
and along with it the incalculability
of risk believable to the opponent. .
.
If we have been successful since the
end of the Second World War in pre-
venting a war here in Europe, we are
not in the least obliged to the fact
that the Warsaw Pact knows that if it
took drastic action in Europe the risk
of nuclear war increases. '9
Worner thus believed that a strong theater force was nec-
essary. During the debate on ERW, he called for the deployment
of both ground launched cruise missiles and enhanced radiation
weapons. He told the Bundestag, "Who would attack us cannot
be allowed to delude himself with the illusion that he could
contrive a war limited to our territory and leaving his own
80territory undamaged." To allow such a sanctuary would "not
only. .. degrade the risk variable in the calculations of a
Soviet planner.
.
.but it will also promote the notion among
Europeans that they have been left in the lurch." Shorter-
range, battlefield weapons such as ERW mounted on Lance
missiles are also necessary according to Worner because they
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apply the principle of deterrence through denial. They make





Worner also argued that ERW were not a 'moral perversion*
but were in fact humane. He said in the Bundestag,
The neutron weapon compared to the present
tactical nuclear potential reduces not
just damage to buildings, but also to
everything, including people. It is a
weapon that meets the Allied damage limits
for the civilian population. . .The only
legitimate question is this: Is it in
the nature of these weapons to prevent the
outbreak of war; to make war less likely
or not.** 2
Worner' s colleagues in the CDU/CSU for the most part agreed
with his analysis. CDU Bundestag Deputy Alois Mertes was
also of the opinion that the Soviet military build-up reached
a critical stage in 1977. During a Bundestag debate on sec-
urity matters he said:
While the West desires parity, the Soviet
side desires superiority—although they
say they only want equality— so that they
maintain parity even after their recent
reductions. Even with this "fictional
parity" they want a contractually assured
superiority. °^
According to Mertes this build-up of Soviet military power
served political ends. During a debate on Munich television
on ERW, he said; "To me it seems to be important to recognize
in this connection that the Soviet Union has always regarded
military power as a power not only for the purpose of defense,
but also for the purpose of political control, and above all
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as power for exerting psychological influence on the opposite
84
side to make him more susceptible to political pressure."
Mertes also agreed with Worner that ERW make for deterrence
through gain denial:
As far as the politician is concerned
the decisive question in this context
is whether this weapon makes war more
probable or less probable. This is the
decisive political question. .. and the
decisive moral question. . .The strength
of the West may well lead the Soviet
Union, which thinks highly politically
and has a great aversion to risks, to





Adelbert Weinstein, a commentator for the Frankfurter Allge-
meine and another participant in the Munich television debate,
agreed. He said, "I might advance the audacious thesis that
if the neutron weapon is capable of halting the other side's
masses of armor, then 19,000 Soviet tanks are rolling scrap
metal. And this is a deterrent effect indeed."
As the Carter Administration moved toward a decision on
ERW in March 1978, the CDU/CSU opposition frequently called
for an end to Schmidt's and the SPD ' s "emotional dithering"
on the issue. CDU Bundestag Deputy Willi Weiskirch accused
Schmidt of handling the problem "without authority." He also
said that "The Chancellor constantly looks over his shoulder
8 6
to the leftist forces in the SPD."
The opposition party, then, during 1977 and 19 78 thought
it imperative to- accede to Carter's demand for public commit-
ment to deployment of enhanced radiation weapons. This
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position was backed by Worrier's analysis of the strategic
problems faced by the NATO alliance. Politicians in the CDU/
CSU also took advantage of the issue to attack the ' leftward
drift' of the Schmidt government.
Egon Bahr and some of his colleagues on the left wing of
the SPD objected to the Worner analysis. In July 1977 Bahr
established the direction of the SPD Left's analysis in a
series of articles in the party newspaper Vorwarts and in
other publications. Bahr emphasized the moral implications of
enhanced radiation weapons. In a July 1977 Vorwarts article,
he quoted Dr. Konrad Kraske, a member of the CDU, whose opinion
was that "the most important moral commandment is the preven-
tion of war through an effective deterrent. All else is
emotional day-dreaming." Bahr attacked Kraske as follows:
"It is impressive that some in the opposition fall all over
themselves in their attempt to spend beyond their budget just
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to acquire a new type of weapon. " Throughout the debate on
ERW Bahr continued to accuse the CDU/CSU of an immoral "poli-
8 8tical greed for atomic weapons."
Bahr's moral arguments against ERW were not confined to
the fact that the CDU/CSU wanted them, however. He consistently
found ERW reprehensible because;
If the preservation of material becomes
the center of what we call progress-and
this was the starting point of the dis-
cussion the past summer— then man runs
the risk of pushing himself out to the
edge. This would be a perversion of
thinking or turning our values upside
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down; or, to express it in the words
of the German Presidium of the Inter-
national Pax Christi Movement: "If it
is said in the discussion that the
neutron bomb is a clean and humane
weapon, then such an utterance represents
a reversal of all values.""
Bahr's dictum that it was perverse to think that "material
goods are more valuable than humanity" led him to the conclu-
sion that the proper solution to the military problem would
be to develop a weapon that "deprives the opponent of the
90
material basis for an attack. " Bahr seemed to believe that
the deaths involved in destroying the 'material basis 1 would
be more legitimately inflicted.
Bahr also doubted that ERW would be an effective deterrent.
In February 1978, he wrote that it had been argued that an ER
warhead was,
Smaller, can be used more purposively,
destroys objectively less and, above
all, seems better suited for defense,
especially against superior tank forces
—
and this is what we would be up against
in the case of a potential adversary.
If all this were true, then thereby an
effective military use would become more
credible and deterrence more effective.
This... is confronted with the other
argument which says that the very en-
hanced probability of its use lowers the
nuclear threshold. 91
He also pointed out that the tactical necessity of stationing
ERW in forward units would significantly reduce the time
available for a decision to employ them. If employment could
not be approved in the new, reduced time available for a
decision, the weapons could be over-run and useless anyway.
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Finally, Bahr criticized the military effectiveness of
ERW on the grounds that the other side would also have such
a weapon within a few years and thus might feel encouraged to
conquer the Federal Republic without destroying its industry.
Bahr doubted that the Soviet threat to Western Europe was
severe enough to warrant deployment of ERW. He argued, how-
ever, that even if the threat were severe, ERW were nonetheless
morally reprehensible and militarily ineffective. The only
legitimate function of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe
would be to link theater nuclear war to strategic nuclear
systems stationed in the United States. Bahr therefore
opposed modernization of the battlefield nuclear capability
in Europe through deployment of ERW. Bahr argued that such
weapons would lower the nuclear threshold and increase the
likelihood that a nuclear war could be confined to Europe.
In other words, such weapons were reprehensible because they
would make strategic nuclear war less likely:
Europe is under the effect of a global
balance consisting of the United States
and the Soviet Union with their respective
allies. The area geographically covered
by the two security systems must be com-
pletely secure. There must be no such
thing as a silent agreement to the effect
that we would not feel so strongly about
it if Neukoln, Hamburg or Sicily were
involved.
For this reason absolute solidarity with-
in the two alliances is the glue holding
the alliances together. In other words,
thinking along such lines as decreasing
the risk for the two superpowers and
increasing it for the allies,... is legi-
timate if you looked at it from the two
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superpowers point of view... For the
allies, however, that is not only
insufficient, it basically undermines
the solidarity of the alliance. . .The
vital interests of the United States
and the Soviet Union can stand a limited
war in Europe. The vital interests of
Germany cannot. 2
Bahr's reluctance to develop a modernized nuclear capability
in the European theater thus made him dependent on US strate-
gic nuclear might. He acknowledged this even more explicitly
by writing that in a Europe-held hostage—he said that all of
Europe is a Berlin writ large— "Security against attack
ultimately resides in the credibility of the global strategic
93potency of the United States..."
While insisting on the maintenance of American strategic
potency, Bahr also argued for continued relaxation of tensions
in Europe:
The policy of detente is based on stra-
tegic-local balance between East and
West, trying to reduce [arms] without
disadvantages to one party or the other.
Detente demands a long term policy crea-
ting confidence through new agreements...
Detente demands steps be made toward
reduction and arms limitation and not




introduction of new systems whi<
create new instabilit .^ 4
This put Bahr into a difficult position: while he believed
that Germany was dependent on American strategic potency, he
feared that any improvement in the American strategic position
would result in destabilization that might destroy detente.
Bahr stopped short of a complete rejection of ERW. He followed
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the official SPD position in saying that the production de-
cision was for the American President alone. He added, however,
that once the production decision was made, only then should
the Federal Republic determine whether the weapon system
should be stationed in West Germany; and then only after ERW
had been introduced in disarmament talks.
A number of other SPD members agreed with Bahr's analysis.
Christian Krause wrote on the Soviet threat in Vorwarts
,
We do not want to proceed here on the
basis of the deliberate propaganda which
continually tries to hammer home that
the East is superior militarily. The
western experts to be taken seriously
are agreed that, given differences in
subareas overall a military balance
exists between the two power groups. ^
5
Alfons Pawelczyk, one of the spokesmen on defense matters for
the SPD Bundestag Eraktion, also objected to the idea that
the Soviet Union had been pursuing the goal of military
superiority. During the September Bundestag debates he said,
Can it not be deduced from that, that the
Warsaw Pact has not increased the numbers
of its land forces in Central Europe
since 1974/75? That alone could be
the basis for an increase in detente
with the goal of securing concrete
results.
At another point Pawelczyk said,
The discussion of security policy is
oriented too simply on the readiness
of the potential opponent to take
risks. The Warsaw Pact has, however,
proven— up to this point— that they
present only calculable risks, which
exclude the possibility of a misunder-
standing and a direct confrontation





Bruno Friedrich, the foreign policy spokesman for the SPD
faction in the Bundestag called for a disarmament initiative
from the Federal Government in lieu of the introduction of the
new ER warhead technology. He termed such a move "a contribu-




Similarly, Pawelczyk told the Bundestag that
An increase in security can only be
reached through arms policy coopera-
tively agreed to by both sides...
A
defensive capability means security
today, and I think no one can doubt
that today security is at hand. .
.
Relaxation and cooperation must in
the future guarantee security at the
lowest possible level.
SPD deputy floorleader in the Bundestag, Horst Ehmke, said
in August 19 77 that arms procurements were a threat to the
human contacts developed during the era of relaxation:
Our apprehension is that one should
not, by reverting to a crusade ideol-
ogy, as it were, bury again what has
been achieved for the people. If
millions of people yearly can visit
each other in divided Germany today. .
.
then this is a practical success for
the human rights of these people. We
do not want to jeopardize this prac-
tical success by making a show of
muscle. . . 99
Finally, many in the left wing of the SPD were not con-
cerned with the warfighting capabilities of nuclear weapons.
For them the only possible function such weapons had was as
a deterrent. Pawelczyk expressed this belief in the supremacy
of deterrence in September 1977:
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The present NATO strategy and every other
strategy can only serve the function of
deterring and warding off aggression that
has been undertaken with a limited risk.
That means that one must proceed with his
planning on the basis that the potential
opponent will pursue policies that are
rational rather than irrational. Against
insanity there is no strategy. ^
Bahr's moralistic pronouncements on ERW and the approach
of some prominent left-wing SPD members were therefore some-
what inconsistent. This group generally asserted that there
had been no Soviet military build-up over the previous decade--
or at least that such a build-up had been exaggerated. They
believed that a substantial nuclear capability on a limited
battlefield would damage the 'vital interests of Germany.
'
They therefore generally advocated that the strategic nuclear
power of the United States be maintained and even modernized
as necessary. This, in their view, was necessary to deter
war— the only function any strategy could legitimately have.
At the same time, however, the left wing of the SPD feared
that any modernized nuclear capability— including both a
weapon such as the enhanced radiation warhead and longer range
weapons - would be a threat to super-power detente and to the
relaxation of tensions between the two sections of Germany.
The last group of politicians whose views on ERW will be
discussed is the government coalition of SPD and FDP. Two
key figures in this group during the controversy were Helmut
Schmidt and Bundestag Deputy Jurgen Mollemann, the FDP spokes-
man on defense matters. The earlier discussion of the events
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in the ERW controversy suggested that Schmidt was personally
open to the possibility of deployment of ERW in Germany—even
if he was unwilling to take a strong public stand. Much of
Schmidt's public hesitation may be explained by the strong
opposition to ERW in the left wing of his own SPD. Schmidt
consistently stated that the ERW production decision was one
for the President of the United States and that the Federal
Republic did not want to and could not participate in such a
decision—directly or indirectly. In spite of this public
neutral stand, Schmidt was clearly disappointed when Carter
initially decided to cancel the ERW program altogether. The
Schmidt government may have been influential in changing the
cancellation to a 'deferment'.
Schmidt's actions during the ERW debate were thus far more
constrained by the position of the SPD left than by the CDU/
CSU who supported the modernization program. Schmidt's FDP
coalition partners were also in favor of ERW deployment— at
least initially. Faced with a recalcitrant and uncompromising
SPD left-wing, however, both Schmidt and Mollemann were forced
to modify and camouflage their support for this form of
theater nuclear modernization.
In November 1977 the German Press Agency reported that
Mollemann had supported ERW by saying that,
deployment of the neutron weapon in
Europe could, while maintaining the
fundamental strategic principles of
the North Atlantic Alliance contribute
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to improving the alliance's deterrent
capability and defensive strength, as
long as efforts to strengthen conventional
combat forces are not neglected. *01
Mollemann was reported to have supported ERW on the grounds
that it could serve as a bargaining chip in disarmament talks.
Mollemann apparently went so far as to suggest that the Fed-
eral Republic should have some control over the use of nuclear
weapons stationed on West German territory. He suggested that
the Federal Republic be given the power of veto.
In December, however, after both the FDP and the SPD had
held their November congresses, Mollemann somewhat modified
his view. In an interview published in Die Welt he stated
that the 'conditional yes 1 advocated by the FDP on ERW meant:
1. Encouragement to the Americans to
produce the weapon. 2. The decision
on its deployment in Europe only when a
more reliable assessment of the course
of the arms control negotiations is
possible; and 3. The clarification that
the neutron weapon is exclusively under-
stood as a political weapon as is true
for the other nuclear weapons as well.
I consider it necessary and logical to
encourage the Americans to produce the
system. This will not be contradicted
by the attempt to use this weapon, which
then will be available, as a motor in
the disarmament talks. ^-^^
As the ERW controversy progressed, the position of Mollemann
and the FDP increasingly emphasized the conditional aspect
of their 'conditional yes'. In November 1977 Mollemann had
pointed out both the deterrent and defensive capabilities of
ERW, but by March 197 8 he was equally concerned with the
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weapon's implications for arms control negotiations. In that
month Mollemann told an interviewer,
During the production phase—which is pro-
jected to be about two years— a balanced
military strength ratio should in some
measure be moved toward a lower level
through the serious and strongly supported
introduction of the neutron weapon in
suitable arms control negotiations. Be-
cause there is an atomic equilibrium between
the blocs created as a result of the SALT
talks, a closer parity in the conventional
realm should now be sought. I am therefore
of the opinion that the neutron weapon will
be discussed at the MBFR negotiations in
Vienna. There it will concern not so much
the SS-20 as the armored forces of the
Warsaw Pact. 103
In short, Mollemann' s views moved further and further
from their position at the beginning of the controversy—
a
position that was not dissimilar to that of Manfred Worner— to
a position resembling the public position of the SPD Chancellor,
It therefore seems that Mollemann and the FDP were maneuvered
by Schmidt into a position more closely aligned to the SPD.
The essence of Schmidt's position on ERW has already been
outlined. What is notable about the development of his posi-
tion, however, was his caution. In July 1977 Schmidt said
that these new warheads,
raise considerable psychological and
strategic problems, both within NATO
and in relationship to the Warsaw pact.
This was something which needed to be
cleared up in NATO in joint deliberations.
If the United States were to announce
the intention of stationing this new
weapon on German soil... there would be
very thorough discussions within the
alliance as well as direct German-
American talks. 10 4
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Yet a story published on the same day Schmidt made his
statement revealed that the Federal Chancellor's office had
long been contemplating the deployment of ER warheads. Per
Spiegel asserted that "A study by the Chancellor's office
compiled in 1974 saw a remedy in a 'combination of novel con-
ventional weapons with the limited use of nuclear weapons of
minimum caliber.'" The report continued that it ought to be
"made clear to all parties involved that the effect of such
nuclear (clean) minimal weapons must indeed be equated with
10 5the large scale use of conventional weapons."
When the Party Congress was held in Hamburg in November
1977 it was clear that opposition to ERW was considerable
within the party. When Schmidt spoke to the convention he
did not refer to ERW directly, but did say again that SALT
made it ever more important "to secure in Europe, as well as
in the conventional realm, a stable equilibrium." To accom-
plish this, Schmidt said, it was necessary to engage in arms
control negotiations as well as maintain an effective defensive
force. Schmidt concluded, "All attempts to drive a wedge
between myself and my party are without purpose: they result
106from naive illusions. I stand in the middle of my Party."
Nonetheless, as noted earlier, the resolution passed by
the Parteigag on the ERW issue clearly showed the influence
of the SPD left-wing,
The Federal Government ought to exert
its influence within the framework of
alliance consultations in order to
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avoid further technical development
of nuclear arms lowering the nuclear
threshold. The Federal Government
has been asked to create the political
and strategic prerequisites within
the framework of security and dis-
armament policies so that storing
the neutron weapon on the territory
of the Federal Republic will not be
107necessary. . . u '
This motion, passed with only one dissenting vote, had
been introduced by a party commission chaired by Herbert Wehner.
It seems, considering the eventual similarity between the FDP
position and this SPD resolution, that Schmidt was able to
change the position of his government coalition partners for
the sake of SPD party unity. The Federal government's position
after November 1977 was essentially that of the SPD— in short,
a position considerably influenced by the thinking of Egon
Bahr.
The government's position on ERW, then, was not significantly
influenced by inter-party politics during 19 77 and 19 78. The
position taken by Manfred Worner and his colleagues in the
CDU/CSU did not have any significant impact on the decisions
taken within the coalition government or on the relationship
between the United States and the Federal Republic. The
Carter Administration does not seem to have looked to the CDU/
CSU for support in their attempt to secure West Germany's
approval.
It seems, in conclusion, that the most important variable





party politics. Although the external
Soviet threat was recognized and attempts were made to counter
it by some segments of the Federal Parliament, the influential
policy makers tended to deny the threat or deny its importance—
at least publicly. The other variable examined here— the
problem of American reliability and declining relative power
—
certainly had an impact on the analyses conducted by those in
power in the Federal Republic. The importance of this variable
was perhaps as important as the machinations of SPD internal
politics. In any case, the American torpor seems to have
produced a paralysis in the Federal Republic as well.
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V. THE LONG RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION DECISION
While the debate on enhanced radiation weaponry had caused
some difficulty in the NATO Alliance, that on long range
theater nuclear weapons seemed less acrimonious— at least on
the surface. This was perhaps because much of the preparation
for the decision was conducted in a more open atmosphere.
Even the Soviet Union for a time seemed less hostile to these
weapons than they had been to ERW. However, the final de-
cision was not as unanimous as had been anticipated. Both
Belgium and the Netherlands were unable to agree to the final
LRTNF program in December 1979. They both deferred final
decisions. The Federal Republic seemed more concerned that
it should not be the only non-nuclear NATO power with LRTNF
on its soil and that arms control negotiations take place,
than with the deployment of Pershing 2 and ground launched
cruise missiles.
At the London meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group in
November 19 76 it was first decided to begin planning on GLCM.
At the next meeting in June 1977, the United States presented
a detailed briefing on the state of development of Cruise
10 8
missiles and the possibilities for deployment in Europe.
It was at this Ottawa meeting that Secretary General Luns
announced that the Soviet Union had begun deployment of the
109SS-20 in the western military regions of Russia.
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(Production decisions on the SS-20 were evidently made by
the Soviet Union no later that 19 70)
.
The next meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group was held
in Bari, Italy. There was considerable enthusiasm expressed
by the European delegations for the development of LRTNF,
either in the form of cruise missiles or IRBM. It was decided
to establish a special High Level Group, chaired by the United
States, to outline the comprehensive needs for theater nuclear
weapons and to develop program proposals. The HLG chairman-
ship position was filled by David E. McGiffert, Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The
initial findings of the HLG were presented in April 19 78
—
just after the decision to defer production of ERW. This first
report called for an evolutionary increase in NATO LRTNF. The
HLG hoped that greater in- theater capacity could be developed,
but recognized that political complications made deployment
-.--. ,. 110difficult.
Some public statements by the Schmidt government seemed to
indicate a more favorable attitude toward this 'evolutionary 1
approach than had been the case toward ERW. In October 1978
at the NPG meeting in Brussels, Defense Minister Apel declared
himself "for the development of a new version of the 'Pershing'
missile with a doubled range..."
This October meeting, however, was disrupted by considerable
disagreement between Apel and Secretary General Luns. Apel
evidently considered that the military in NATO had too much
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influence over the LRTNF decision. He reportedly accused
Luns of weak leadership by allowing military men to make too
many decisions and politicians too few. After the Brussels
NPG meeting, Luns traveled to Bonn to straighten the matter
out in talks with Chancellor Schmidt. Eventually ruffled
feathers were smoothed, but the episode brought into the open
a latent West German dissatisfaction with the work of the HLG
112
and the NPG.
On January 4 to 6 , 1979 the leaders of the United States
Britain, France and West Germany met at Guadaloupe. According
to Richard Burt of The New York Times the SS-20 was a major
concern of the summit. Four weapons systems were discussed
as a response to the Soviet deployment. These were sea and
ground launched cruise missiles, an extended range Pershing,
and a new medium-range ballistic missile. These systems were
all to have a range greater than 1,000 miles: they would all
113be able to strike the Soviet Union.
The Guadaloupe conference touched off a period of debate
in West Germany on security policy. The government maintained
a position similar to the one it had held on the ERW issue.
On January 21 Apel said in a television interview,
First, the Federal Republic of Germany
seeks no power of disposition over atomic
weapons. .. Second, the U.S. is the West's
primary nuclear power. There, America needs
to take on the leadership function. But,
third, naturally we have our responsibility
to shoulder. And, fourth, the whole issue
is a matter of high policy and nobody
should get into in alone—certainly not the
Federal Republic of Germany.
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On February 1, 1979, government spokesman Klaus Boiling
reported that a Cabinet meeting the previous day had discussed
the European nuclear problem. The Cabinet called for a re-
duction of Soviet Euro-strategic weapons systems in the frame-
work of SALT III. They added, however, "We are not a nuclear
power, and we do not seek our own nuclear weapons. As for
the problem of the 'grey zone' we think this involves. .. nuclear
weapons systems and as such the problem is primarily one for
..115the nuclear powers.
Schmidt was concerned that Soviet military power in Europe
was becoming dangerous, however. In his own report on the
January Cabinet meeting, Schmidt told his party that,
When the Soviet Union puts into service
every year 30 to 50 new SS-20 missiles,
each with at least three warheads, and
also puts into service 30 to 50 new
Backfire bombers, one can see that in
the course of the 1980s... the Soviet
Union could theoretically be put in
the position of using military intimi-
dation for political purposes. H°
The floor leader of the Social Democratic Party, Herbert
Wehner, did not agree with the Chancellor. He claimed that
Soviet arms were not offensively but defensively oriented.
He also declared in Die Neue Gesellschaft that "it is not in
keeping with the Federal Republic's true position to argue that
new weapons systems are indispensable. . .rather than to urge
NATO to aim first and foremost at arms limitation and disarm-
117
ament. " Wehner 's comments touched off a flurry of




In March 1979, the commanding general of the 12th Armored
Division of the Bundeswehr, Gurt Bastian, declared that Wehner
was right in assessing Soviet forces as defensive in orienta-
tion and only preparing for 'the event of an aggression. 1 The
case was also widely publicized. The government did nothing
118to punish Bastian: he even retained his command. This
incident would have little importance except that it might be
a demonstration of the influence of the left wing of the SPD.
They would not want to see a like-minded member of the Bundeswehr
discharged.
The Federal Republic also seemed to continue to distrust
the 'military influence 1 in possible NATO decisions on LRTNF.
Schmidt's government, therefore, requested— along with the
Netherlands— that a second study group be established in the
NPG. This group would work in parallel with the High Level
Group on arms control aspects of LRTNF modernization. This
new subcommittee was to be called the Special Group and also
was chaired by an American representative, Leslie Gelb of the
State Department. Gelb was later succeeded by Reginald
Bartholomew.
In April the NPG met at Homestead Air Force Base, Florida.
The meeting concluded that it would be necessary to maintain
and modernize theater nuclear forces. The HLG and the SG
119
were tasked to develop specific proposals by the autumn.
Some in West Germany saw the Homestead declarations as
merely a ploy to get the US Senate to pass SALT II. They
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thought Carter was cynically using LRTNF to increase the
safety of the United States—by limiting strategic arms
—
while increasing the threat to Europe. The Munich newspaper,
Suddeutsche Zeitung commented;
...there is reason not to take it too
seriously because the missile fanfare of
Homestead possibly may have served its
purpose by helping the SALT II agreement
to be passed more quickly in the Senate. .
.
the curtailments imposed by the SALT
agreement with regard to intercontinental
missiles have been dodged by Moscow in
the field of medium and short range
missiles in Europe, thus creating a miliar,
tary and political advantage for itself.
In July 1979 the Special Group began meeting on a monthly
basis to iron out difficulties between the members on arms
control proposals. According to Karl Felmeyer in the Frank-
furter Allgemeine Zeitung
,
the Special Group was faced with
the dilemma of developing a proposal the Soviet Union would
find suitable as a basis for negotiation, but which did not
include the French and British nuclear forces. Felmeyer wrote,
"A demand for parity between American and Soviet medium range
arms would be impossible [but any other formula] would be
problematic because it could be interpreted as Western pre-
121paredness to accept Soviet superiority."
There was concern during the summer of 19 79 with the Soviet
reaction to LRTNF. In June the Bonn newspaper Die Welt
reported that the Soviet reaction was relatively mild, but
implied that this was only a ploy: "If it is possible to
deploy this weapon [Pershing 2] together with others, Bonn
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wants nothing to do with its handling. The field is wide and
the Russians are already tilling it with a strategy of smiles
v . 122
vis-a-vis the Germans." This policy of smiles was not
without its darker side, however. On March 2, Leonid Brezhnev
had given a speech in which he warned against U.S. attempts
to deploy LRTNF in Germany and hinted that these weapons might
jeopardize the economic gains of detente:
Reports have been appearing ever more
frequently of late that the Pentagon
is putting pressure on the Federal
Republic of Germany to obtain its con-
sent to the stationing in that country
of medium range nuclear missiles aimed
at the Soviet Union. . . the implementation
of these plans, just like the plans of
the U.S. military with regard to neutron
weapons, would result only in a new in-
crease in tension in Europe and also in
a drastic increase in the danger to the
FRG itself.
The economic ties between European countries
are becoming more stable. .. such agreements
are a sort of East-West capital invest-
ment in a very necessary and mutually
advantageous business— the preservation , 2 3
and consolidation of international peace.
The Soviets, then, took something of a different approach
to LRTNF modernization than they had on ERW. While the Soviet
position on the possible deployment of ERW had been explicitly
negative, a year later Brezhnev sometimes smiled, sometimes
frowned.
On June 18, 1979, after six years of negotiation, the SALT
II accords were signed by Carter and Brezhnev. The ceremonies
in Vienna were to prove the high-water mark— at least for a
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time— of the Soviet-American detente. From the European
perspective, however, they did little more than to confirm
symbolically the parity of the United States and the Soviet
Union. To many, Vienna represented not so much the solution
to old problems as confirmation of a new European political
situation.
At the beginning of September, while demonstrations against
LRTNF were conducted in Bonn, a conference was held in
Brussels on the issue. This symposium, organized by George-
town University, the Atlantic Treaty Association, and the
Atlantic Institute, was addressed by such luminaries as Henry
Kissinger and Alexander Haig. In the conference keynote
address, Kissinger— in something of a self-reversal— said that
If there is no theater nuclear establishment
on the continent of Europe, we are writing
the script for selective blackmail in which
our allies will be threatened, and in which
we will be forced into a decision whereby
we can respond only with a strategy that has
no military purpose but only the aim of
destruction of populations. ^-24
While Kissinger's call for deployment of LRTNF echoed
through the halls of power in Brussels, the West German Foreign
Minister Genscher tried to convince representatives of the
Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg to accept some of the
125
new missiles on their territory. As usual the West German
government emphasized that deployment should be diffused




On September 4, the Federal Ministry of Defense released
a defense white paper. This analysis of the security position
of West Germany noted that "Our Ostpolitik has proved satis-
facotry," and that economic relations with the East were
proving beneficial. On the nuclear balance, the White Paper
judged the sides to be essentially equal:
An overall comparison of the East's and
the West's nuclear potentials shows that,
due to the conceptual and structural inter-
linkage of the central strategic nuclear
forces of the United States with the nuclear
forces in Europe and in the light of the
existing essential overall equivalence ,
?fideterrence is ensured at the present time.
The White Paper pointed out, however, that in medium-range
systems, the Soviet Union enjoyed a considerable superiority.
Taken together the U.S., British and French medium range sys-
tems in Europe totalled 386. The study put Soviet systems at
1,370. The disparity was assessed as follows: "Warsaw Pact
superiority in the medium-range potential can only be offset
by resorting to the overall deterrence spectrum. The Alliance




By the end of September, the HLG and the SG had completed
their respective studies. They met in Brussels on 28 September
to ensure their findings were complementary. The recommenda-
tions for an evolutionary upward adjustment of LRTNF and the
arms control initiative were found by the two groups to be
compatible, and they were forwarded to Secretary General Luns.
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The Chairmen of the HLG and SG then prepared a draft Integrated
Decision Document which was sent along with the two committee
reports to the governments involved for review.
In the meantime, on Wednesday October 5, some of the tanks
of the Soviet 6th Guards Army began a withdrawal from East
Germany. Brezhnev announced in East Berlin on the occassion
of the anniversary of the founding of the German Democratic
Republic that the Group of Soviet Forces Germany would be
reduced by 20,000 troops and 1,000 tanks. This unilateral
gesture was accompanied by a warning, however. Brezhnev said
that if NATO went ahead with LRTNF modernization, it would
"destroy the basis" for further arms negotiations. To empha-
size the point to the Germans, Andrei Gromyko flew to Bonn
where he told a press conference that there would be no dis-
128
armament talks if the NATO missile program went ahead.
In November, less than a month before the meeting of NATO
Foreign and Defense Ministers, Schmidt spoke before a caucus
of SPD Bundestag members. In his discussion, he emphasized
the need for a Western response to the Soviet theater threat:
In the course of the last two years, the East
has achieved a quantum leap in the quality of
their continental-strategic weapons. . .For two
years the SS-20 has been deployed to the Soviet
forces on a very efficient basis... This has had
an impact on the problem of equilibrium be-
cause SALT II has codified parity in inter-
continental forces and because an American
strategic superiority no longer exists: a
superiority that could have—and did—offset
a Euro-strategic deficit. 29
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Schmidt went on to say that Secretary General Brezhnev
had written in a letter to the government of the Federal
Republic that he was willing to negotiate the LRTNF issue.
Schmidt said that Brezhnev had backed this official offer with
public offers in Berlin and in an article in Pravda. Schmidt
told his colleagues that he would propose that the United
States and the Soviet Union should begin negotiations as soon
as possible.
On December 4, 1979, Chancellor Schmidt spoke to his Party
Congress in Berlin. He repeated almost word for word the
analysis he had given to the Bundestagfraktion a few weeks
before. Once again he emphasized the need for LRTNF in the
context of arms control:
We shall continue in the eighties to make
our appropriate contribution within NATO
to the collective defense of the West. .
.
But our responsibility at the same time
demands fresh efforts to achieve arms
control and disarmament. .. I am firmly
convinced that the leadership of the
Soviet Union wants peace. .. Equal balance
and 'equal security' for both sides are
prerequisites for the success of detente
and arms control policy. ^0
Schmidt also pointed out that detente in Europe had consider-
ably profited the German people as a whole: "It is thanks to
the policy of detente that Central Europe is no longer the
critical point of conflict, that millions of people in the
West who visit the East have helped to preserve the national
substance of our people."
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Schmidt's position was not supported by the entire party,
however. What might be called the disarmament wing of the SPD
put far greater emphasis on the arms control aspects of the
impending LRTNF decision. Karsten Voigt, a delegate to the
convention from Hessen-Sud, said during the debate on LRTNF
modernization:
We must put the brakes on the process that
drives the arms race... the weapons decision
can be withdrawn when political negotiations
make it superfluous. If the will to negotiate
is in earnest, then the forthcoming decision
can be merely tentative and in principle.
The decision on deployment—whether and how
many weapons to deploy—need be made only
after the results of the negotiations have
been evaluated and before actual stationing
starts. .. even this new resolution on deploy-
ment may be tentative—we do not have to be
automatic on this— if we decide on further
talks. 131
Saying that he intended to "bring all nuclear weapons to
the negotiation table," Alfons Pawelczyk, a member of the
Platform Committee, put the motion on LRTNF before the
assembly. The passed version read in part:
The disparities in the nuclear medium range
potentials should be compensated for by a
combination of defense and arms control
measures.
These should include:
-Political priority to arms control arrange-
ments so as to reduce instabilities in this
way;
-At the same time fixing the necessary de-
fense options which could become effective
if arms control efforts fail... the Federal
Government should consent to the medium range
90

weapons, to be developed by the U.S....
being stationed in Europe (in 19 83 at
the earliest) only on condition that
their introduction can be renounced
should arms control negotiations lead
to satisfactory results. 132
The SPD Congress, then, allowed Schmidt to agree to NATO
proposals for LRTNF provided Germany was not the only stationing
country and provided negotiations were pursued and failed prior
to deployment. Schmidt's success at the Party Congress was
widely regarded as a victory for his policy and a successful
compromise with at least some of the disarmament wing of the
party. Once again however, as with the ERW issue, Schmidt's
party had left him with very little room to maneuver. With
an election less than a year away, he could not afford to
alienate a powerful faction in his party. A split in the party
could well have meant the end of his coalition government
since the CDU/CSU was the largest single party.
While Schmidt was working with his party in Berlin, other
European capitals were also struggling with the LRTNF problem.
Several found themselves stalemated on the issue. On December
6, ministers from Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands
traveled to Washington to discuss alternatives to LRTNF mod-
ernization. They asked for delay of the NATO Council meeting
that was scheduled to rule on LRTNF deployment. In this case
the Carter Administration stood firm. Jody Powell said, "It
133
is our view that this should go forward in December."
91

On December 12, 1979, the Foreign and Defense Ministers
of the NATO alliance met in Brussels. The proposals for
LRTNF modernization and the arms control initiative developed
by the High Level Group and the Special Group were agreed
upon by all except Belgium and the Netherlands. In those two
countries the coalition governments had proven "too fragile to
establish agreement on the issue. Belgium initially postponed
its decision for six months, while the Netherlands suspended
participation in the deployment decision for two years.
The December decision anticipated deployment of 10 8
Pershing 2 missiles and 464 GLCM in Europe. The Federal Re-
public's share of these LRTNF was to be all 108 Pershings and
9 6 GLCM. The arms control proposal contained five points:
1. Any future limitations on U.S. systems
principally designed for theater missions
should be accompanied by appropriate limit-
ations on Soviet theater systems.
2. Limitations on U.S. and Soviet long
range theater nuclear systems should be
negotiated bilaterally in the SALT III
framework in a step-by- step approach.
3. The immediate objective of these
negotiations should be the establishment
of agreed limitations on U.S. and Soviet
land-based long range theater nuclear
missile systems.
4. Any agreed limitations on these sys-
tems must be consistent with the principle
of equality between the sides. Therefore,
the limitation should take the form of a
de jure equality in both ceilings and in
rights.




The December decision seemed for the time being at least,
to be a victory for the Carter Administration. Most of the
Alliance had agreed to the stationing of LRTNF in Europe.
There were still forces, however, working against deployment
on the continent. In the Federal Republic those forces had
already shown their strength during the debate in that country




VI. THE LRTNF DEBATE IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
When the debate in West Germany on LRTNF began in the
spring of 1979, it was often as confused and irrational as
that on ERW the year before. Many of those involved seemed
unable to escape parochial perspectives. It was difficult
for some commentators to seriously address the problems of
European defense; peripheral issues and obfuscation often
dominated public discourse. Few were willing to examine in
detail the wartime battlefield, strategic, and political
effects of long-range theater nuclear weapons.
General Johannes Steinhoff, a retired Chairman of NATO's
Military Committee, has noted that such confusion results
from the inability of Europe-and the Federal Republic-to
answer some fundamental questions:
Everything hangs on the answer NATO gives





The structure of the forces, nuclear
doctrine and weapons systems, and the
necessary reserve forces must all be
planned in reference to such questions.
To put it bluntly the Europeans fail to
answer how they want to be defended. ^5
With some exceptions , West German participants in the LRTNF
debate did not consider Steinhoff s fundamental question.
Their concern was often not so much the development of a more




As in the debate on ERW, three major schools of thought
were important. These were again associated with major poli-
tical factions. The first, consisting of the CDU/CSU opposi-
tion, believed that LRTNF were useful war-fighting weapons.
This, they thought, enhanced their deterrent function. CDU/
CSU defense commentators also considered LRTNF a link to US
strategic forces. These were the only commentators who
emphasized balanced and integrated military capabilities.
The second group consisted of members of the SPD left. These
commentators were concerned that arms efforts not interfere
with detente. For many in this group, the declining strategic
power of the United States meant that a link through LRTNF to
US strategic forces was not as important as it had once been.
They therefore believed negotiatiated limits on both strategic
and theater nuclear arms should be the primary objective of
the entire LRTNF program. The final group—consisting of the
government coalition— seems to have been convinced that after
the ERW difficulties, some sort of positive steps were needed
toward LRTNF modernization. They welcomed LRTNF as an enhance-
ment of flexible response. Schmidt, however, was severely
limited by the opposition in his own party. In order to
maintain SPD unity, the government as a whole was required to
emphasize the negotiation aspect of the LRTNF program.
The CDU/CSU parties believed that the Soviet Union had
continued its arms build-up since the previous year's debate
on ERW. They took the position that the twin objectives of
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deterrence and detente could only be achieved through 'assured
defensive capability. * Dr. Zimmermann, a CDU/CSU delegate
to the Bundestag, said during the extensive debates on defense
matters in March 1979, that the most important problem for
European defense was the Soviet Eurostrategic potential. He
went on to describe the dimensions of the Soviet preponderance:
For quite a long time, hundreds of
Soviet medium-range missiles have been
targeted on sites in Western Europe. But
now new Soviet missiles of the SS-20 type
have been added which can be fired from
mobile pads and are equipped with three
warheads— a potential with a range of
4,000 kilometers, which can hit anyplace
in Western Europe... but also China and
all places of strategic importance in
the Middle East. By the mid 1980s the
Soviet Union— according to latest esti-
mates—will have 300 to 400 launchers. 3 °
The Chairman of the Bundestag Defense Committee, Manfred
Worner, agreed with Zimmermann. During the same Bundestag
debate he noted that "These medium-range missiles are aimed
at us. We are the object of these new Soviet missiles..."
He emphasized the unique capabilities of the SS-20.
The situation has been altered on the
one hand because the SS-20 is mobile.
It has also been altered because the
launcher can be re-fired—each has
three re- loads. It has been altered
because each missile has three war-
heads. Thus, one hundred carriers
deply 900 warheads. . .The situation is
changed because these warheads— in
contrast to previously deployed MRBM
—
have pinpoint accuracy. This means




In the view of the CDU/CSU, the Soviet effort in the
military realm was part of an attempt to gain superiority-
over Europe through military power. Zimmermann discounted
Brezhnev's statements that the Soviet Union had no superiority
and desired none. He contended that the Soviet superiority
had grown to overpower the West to such an extent that "it
is the main strategic concern of the United States."
Dr. Helmut Kohl, former CDU/CSU candidate for chancellor,
in an official party statement, outlined the Soviet build-up.
He made six points on the character of the Soviet military
machine:
1. In the area of strategic nuclear weapons,
virtual parity exists at the beginning of
the 19 80s between the United States and the
Soviet Union. .
.
2. In the area of medium range nuclear
weapons, the Soviet Union has a clear
superiority as the result of the SS-20
and the Backfire Bomber. .
.
3. The Soviet Union is about to reach a
numerical and qualitative superiority in
the realm of tactical nuclear weapons.
4. The threshold of Warsaw Pact super-
iority in conventional forces was crossed
long ago... Before the phase of detente
NATO had at its disposal a clear qualita-
tive advantage. Today the Soviet Union
has also equalled us in this...
5. The Soviet Union has built her Air
Force and Navy into a world-wide military
instrument that must be accounted for
in a correlation of forces.
6. The Soviet Union is also prepared
to use its Cuban mercenaries to inter-
vene in regional crises. It must be
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said clearly in the German Parliament
that it is alarming that the GDR has
assumed a similar role. 138
This general Soviet arms build-up, and especially the nuclear
threat to Europe, then, resulted in considerable agitation
among CDU/CSU members of the Bundestag. A number feared that
the balance had already tipped in the favor of the USSR.
Dr. Zimmermann noted that "even if the United States could
introduce new weapons systems immediately, which is impossible,"
139NATO would still be unable to match the Warsaw Pact in Europe.
As a result of this assessment of Soviet armament, CDU/CSU
members of the Bundestag doubted Soviet commitment to detente
and arms limitation. Their analysis indicated that the Soviet
Union had as its objective the military domination of the
European continent. Detente was a sort of ruse used to hide
Soviet attempts to gain superiority and to lull the West into
inadequate arms efforts. CDU/CSU analysts believed that the
Soviet Union had not essentially changed its European objec-
tives since the days of Stalin. In their view, the Russian
leadership still wanted to reduce American influence on the
continent, cause NATO to be disbanded, and increase Soviet
influence. Dr. Zimmermann said during the March 19 79 Bundestag
defense debate:
Interim goals of the Soviet Union are
the weakening of the United States, the
severance of Western Europe from the
Atlantic pact system, and the subordina-
tion of the Western European states to
Soviet hegemony. The attractiveness of
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these interim goals lie in the idea that
the economic potential of the East bloc
and Western Europe combined would exceed
the potential of the United States... "
According to Zimmerman, these goals had remained constant dur-
ing the era of detente. He said that "detente to the Soviet
Union has been nothing else to date but the continuation of
141
a politics of expansion through other means."
For a number of CDU/CSU politicians, the government itself
used detente as a screen to hide the growing Soviet military
power from West German citizens. Manfred Worner was reported
by the German Press Agency to have said that "the Federal
Government had not dared to inform the public about the mas-
sive Soviet arms buildup because it did not fit into the
142image of detente." Alois Mertes commented in the Frank-
furter Allgemeine Zeitung that the lack of western response
to Soviet build-up was not simply the result of deception
caused by detente. He noted that the Soviet system was re-
jected by the peoples living "between the Bug and the Elbe."
He said that because Western Europeans have not been ideolo-
gically challenged by the East, however, they have not felt
143threatened. CDU/CSU politicians—whether they saw the lack
of Western response as the result of a sense of well being,
or the result of unwillingness to face up to the challenges




CDU/CSU politicians also accused the Federal Government
of failure to resist the left wing of the SPD on defense
matters. Manfred Worner in an interview on Radio Free Berlin
said, "...on the decisive point of military imbalance espe-
cially in the field of medium range missiles, the Federal
Government avoids any concrete conclusion; it dodges the
issue. . .we must fear that it will ultimately yield to the
144pressure of the SPD leftwingers under the leadership of Wehner."
Wehner and other members of the SPD left were extensively
criticized by the CDU/CSU during the defense debates. Franz
Josef Strauss said that the SPD floorleader was trying "to
145
push the SPD more and more toward self-FinlandizatiOn.
"
Alois Mertes stated that Wehner was—along with Egon Bahr and
Willy Brandt— an unwitting agent of Soviet policy toward the
Western alliance. He said in an interview on Deutschlandfunk
that,
The Soviets do not expect a withdrawal of
the Federal Republic of Germany from the
Western alliance. . .But what the Soviets
are trying to achieve is that we, remain-
ing in NATO, exercise our good offices in
the alliance to attain greater Western
receptiveness to Soviet concepts. . .with
the Federal Republic not turning neutral
and formally withdrawing from the alliance
but, in substance, pursuing a policy which
ultimately meets Soviet interests. .. [Wehner
]
is so concerned that the fruit of detente,...
might be jeopardized that he feels we should
make allowances for Soviet ideas. 4 "
Walther Kiep, a member of the CDU presidium, reported
that Wehner' s influence was viewed with alarm in Washington:
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All I can tell you from my recent visit to
Washington is that the clear position of
the foreign minister (on relations with the
Soviet Union) t which I might call the Wehner
syndrome, has come across clearly there. .
.
as far as what Herbert Wehner stated, there
is only alarm in Washington. They wonder
anxiously whether this might be the begin-
ning of a change of priorities in German
politics. 147
The position of the CDU/CSU on the Soviet military build-
up and on detente, then, was based on considerable suspicion
of Soviet motives and intentions. CDU/CSU analysts were
convinced that the Kremlin continued to work toward objectives
in Europe that had been established at the end of the Second
World War; the elimination of the United States as a European
power, and the enhancement of their own power in Europe. CDU/
CSU analysts acknowledged that these Soviet goals were being
sought with new methods. Detente and the willingness to nego-
tiate, however, were in their eyes, not a fundamental change
in goals, but a cover for pursuit of the old objectives.
Therefore, they saw Herbert Wehner and other vocal supporters
of detente as unwitting agents of Soviet policies. These West
German politicians, according to CDU/CSU commentators, were
used by clever Soviet leaders for their own ends. CDU/CSU
politicians also contended that the SPD left wing was reducing
the room for maneuver of the Federal Government and jeopard-
izing the stability of the Atlantic Alliance.
Although this analysis of the SPD was clearly partisan,
it seems to have had some substance. During both the ERW and
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LRTNF decisions, the SPD party Congresses had passed resolu-
tions making it difficult for Schmidt's government to parti-
cipate in nuclear weapons deployment in Europe. This, added
to a natural inclination to keep Germany as nuclear-free as
possible, meant that the Schmidt government was indeed
hesitant on nuclear weapons.
The CDU/CSU position on LRTNF modernization was, in spite
of this analysis, not always as firmly for improvements as
might have been expected. Perhaps CDU/CSU politicians did
not want to be too outspoken for fear of offending other
European allies. In any case, while they called for modern-
ization of long-range theater nuclear capabilities, they
sometimes down-played the role West Germany should have in
the decision.
Dr. Worner in February 1979 declared that any LRTNF
decision should be made in the NATO context. He explicitly
rejected the idea that a decision on deployment of LRTNF
could be made bilaterally between the Federal Republic and
the United States. In an interview on Radio Free Berlin, he
said,
It is an explicit subject of a NATO de-
cision. I would like to put it more
correctly by saying a decision of the
American President. This is not a matter
of German nuclear arms. We do not want
any nuclear arms; we do not have any
and this is the way it should be. 4 °
In some ways, this position sounded like that Chancellor
Schmidt took on the issue. CDU/CSU politicians, however,
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believed that the Federal Government should support publicly
a decision in favor of LRTNF modernization. Worner continued,
"The American President is playing the leading role, but the
Federal Government must say clearly what it is prepared to do.
It must support the stationing of such American arms in
,,149Europe.
"
CDU/CSU leaders very much wanted the United States to
assume responsibility for the LRTNF decision. They seem to
have recognized that the West German electorate was unwilling
to allow its own government to take a strong stand on the
issue. On the other hand, they seem to have thought that West
Germans would willingly follow an American lead. Dr. Zimmerman's
speech during the March Bundestag debate constituted an appeal
to the United States to
...take decisions, first, on the preservation
of the balance in the intercontinental stra-
tegic sphere— I am thinking here of MX and
Trident— second, on bringing about a sem-
blance of balance in the Eurostrategic
area— I am thinking here of Pershing 2 and
ground launched Cruise Missiles— third, on
restoring the balance on the battlefield.
In this area new technologies as well as
the neutron weapons would have to be taken
into consideration in order to offset the
three-fold Soviet tank superiority. 150
In July 1979, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung reported
that Alois Mertes also feared that American leadership was
faltering. He was reported to have said that the credibility
of the American security guarantee for Europe is not based
solely on power but primarily on the confidence of the
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Europeans in the American President's ability to act as a
political leader. In a statement released on 18 June 1979,
CDU Chairman Helmut Kohl concurred, noting that,
Psychological and political stability in
Western Europe, including the Federal
Republic of Germany, depends strongly on
the people continuing to regard the nuclear
protection of the United States as credible. .
.
If the impression gained foothold among
the German and West European public that
the global-strategic and the Europe-related
continental-strategic power ratio is shift-
ing to the disadvantage of the United
States and the Atlantic Alliance, this
might release tendencies toward a poli-
tical understanding with the Soviet world
power, something which the CDU has , 52
unequivocally opposed for decades...
The CDU/CSU, thus found it essential that the United States
take the lead in developing LRTNF. Some CDU/CSU politicians
hesitated to call on the United States directly, but they
made it clear that they expected the Carter Administration to
fulfill its role as the strongest of the NATO allies.
Many of these CDU/CSU observers of the European strategic
scene thought LRTNF were valuable weapons because of their use
as means of keeping the Soviet Union from becoming a sanctuary
in a European war. Perhaps more interesting, some defense
observers advocated LRTNF as a means of gaining more robust
escalation options for NATO.
In the fall of 1977, Manfred Worner wrote in Strategic
Review that,
. . . the territory of the USSR cannot be
allowed, in theory or in practice, to
become a sanctuary in the nuclear phase
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of a conflict in Europe. The Soviet
Union cannot be invited to contemplate
a war limited exclusively to Western
Europe, or even to German territory.
Moscow must at all times be forced to ,_
3
reckon with the full ladder of escalation.
Worner was also concerned that the NATO stockpile of long-
range theater nuclear weapons should be secure, modern and
useful on the battlefield. Worner indicated that it was cri-
tical for the success of deterrence whether NATO could realist-
ically mount a ground defense in the Federal Republic. But,
NATO would also have to "replace the manned delivery systems
—
especially those assigned to nuclear interdiction and strike
missions—with unmanned vehicles like cruise missiles." This
would render it clear, through the placement of tactical
nuclear weapons and corresponding declaratory policies, that
"escalation in the event of a conflict does not have strict
limits, but instead extends to the possible use of U.S.
154
strategic nuclear systems."
Worner' s analysis was shared and expanded by Uwe Nerlich
in the Winter 1980 Washington Quarterly . Both battlefield
use and escalatory options of TNFs were the subjects of
Nerlich' s article. He agreed with Worner that
. . .modernizing TNFs is of marginal import-
ance, unless NATO has enough conventional
sustaining power to take, eventually, the
Kissinger advice the Soviet Union appears
to have taken many years ago: 'The pur-
pose of the conventional forces would be
to create optimum conditions for the use
of tactical nuclear weapons.' ...NATO will
have to prepare initial-use options with
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some conceivable coercive bargaining
impact. .. .NATO must not allow the Soviet
Union to get too confident about its
ability to control the escalatory pro-
cesses, but rather must regain some
escalatory options and deny the Soviet
Union some incentives to preempt. "5
Nerlich feared, however, that long-range theater nuclear capa-
bilities—capabilities that should grant escalatory options
—
would not be integrated into a doctrine for the employment of
theater nuclear forces. Even the Nuclear Planning Group has
not produced targeting doctrine agreed upon by all NATO
members. Thus, "There is growing understanding in NATO that
new long range theater capabilities will be required for im-
plementing limited employment options, including those that
effectively link SlOP-and NOP... But NATO has no agreed-on
doctrine yet for how to utilize such options under what
,,156
circumstance.
The CDU/CSU position on LRTNF may be summarized as one of
support for the modernization proposals that emerged from the
NPG and the other NATO channels. CDU/CSU leaders tended to
believe that such weapons should be part of an integrated
effort to maintain deterrence at all military levels in the
European theater. They also believed, however, that the
United States should take the leadership role in developing
and deploying the LRTNF. At the same time they accused the
SPD of weakness on the issue. They blamed Schmidt for being
overly influenced by the left wing of his party.
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The disarmament wing of the Social Democrats took virtually
the opposite view from that of the CDU/CSU on almost every
point at issue in the LRTNF debate. They contended that the
Soviet military build-up was either miniscule or non-existent.
They feared that Western efforts at arms improvements would
spell disaster for detente. They saw modernization of the
long-range nuclear capability only as a bargaining chip in
arms limitation negotiations. For this reason they advocated
deployment of LRTNF only if such negotiations failed.
Herbert Wehner's assessment of the Soviet military as a
defensive organization has already been briefly mentioned.
In an interview on Hamburg television in February 1979, he
expanded on this theme. He said that Soviet arms were not
designed to carry out operations of the sort the Wehrmacht
executed in September 19 39. Instead they were designed to
secure the territories of the Warsaw Pact and prevent efforts
toward national independence; "What they probably want to
achieve, primarily with their tanks, is the security of what
is sometimes referred to as their empire."
Horst Ehmke, an SPD Bundestag member, supported Wehner's
position during the Bundestag defense debates in March 19 79.
He said,
The Soviet Union did not have any atomic
weapons at the beginning of the arms race,
while the United States possessed a mono-
poly. Criticism cannot be leveled at the
Soviet Union for attempting to achieve
parity. These attempts to improve were




Alfons Pawelczyk, another SPD Bundestag member closely
associated with the Schmidt government's disarmament policies,
criticized the CDU/CSU position on medium-range weapons as
resting on "First, exaggeration (of the Soviet threat) ; second,
reunification of Germany; third, armament before arms control
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negotiations. We cannot agree to any of these."
The left wing of the SPD, then, either denied that a
Soviet arms build-up existed, or asserted that such arms build-
up as did occur was only defensive. They feared, however,
that exaggerated estimates of the Soviet military potential
would destroy detente. Die Welt accounted for Wehner* s analysis
of the LRTNF issue as follows,
Wehner is not very interested in the
missiles, but he realized that.
.
.armament
by NATO in the sector of medium-range
missiles would be bound to destroy the
picture of the peaceable Soviet Union,
that this would deprive the concept of
detente of its credibility and thus do
away with the original ideological basis
of the Social-Liberal coalition. 160
In the eyes of this faction of the SPD, detente had brought
peace to Europe. During the Bundestag debates on LRTNF, Wehner
said that the security of the Federal Republic resided in
treaties with the West—even in military integration with the
West. But, this was only part of German security, "Because
a man can best stand, but cannot move on only one leg; it was
16
1
necessary, to find a second leg— the treaties with the East."
Ehmke also contended that 'relaxation' was the objective
of the Soviet Union. He asked in the Bundestag,
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Whether the Soviet Union will continue to
be motivated to participate in detente.
I am of the opinion that this motivation
will continue and that this is the critical
factor in the success of detente. As
President Carter has said, the Soviet
Union— like Western nations—wants to pro-
tect itself, to have its security recognized,
and to expand its influence as far as
practicable. This is the way of the world;
it serves no purpose to whine about it. 162
This view of the Soviet Union as a great power acting as
any great power does in the international political arena, was
at the opposite pole from that of the CDU/CSU. While the left
faction of the SPD saw Soviet intentions as benign and peace-
ful, the CDU/CSU believed the Soviets were using detente as
a cover for expansion of its military forces and influence.
The disarmament faction of the SPD—because of its view of
Soviet intentions— insisted that security for Europe could be
achieved in a general, over-all balance between the East and
the West.
Pawelczyk believed that since Soviet motives were not to
dominate the world, but rather to establish a place for it-
self as a great power, an over-all balance was both possible
and desirable. Thus, stability was not just a matter of
military forces, but concerned a broad spectrum of political,
economic and military affairs. In May 1979, he wrote that,
Stability will be achieved only if parity
in the entire sphere of politics is sought.
NATO has interests in security policy, the
Warsaw Pact needs economic cooperation on a
long-term basis. Both bases might serve
for developing an understanding. .. Influen-
tial forces in the West are afraid that
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they might extend arms assistance by
granting economic assistance; the East
is concerned that increasing coopera-
tion might have the effect of infil-
tration. 163
In order to ensure an overall balance Pawelczyk believed
that LRTNF modernization should only be undertaken in con-
junction with arms control negotiations. During the Bundestag
arms debate , he said,
We have a plan to improve both weapons
and material that is completely worked
out, and in part implemented. . .But I
want to ask you not simply to concentrate
on this part of our policy. Along with
the steps we have taken in defense-
policy we have also emphasized arms
control policy. 16 ^
Since the Soviet threat was not as great as some claimed,
and since a stable European balance could only be achieved
through negotiation, many in the arms control faction of the
SPD believed that the only use of plans for modernized LRTNF
was as a bargaining chip in arms control negotiations.
Pawelczyk again;
We must guard against too quick a deploy-
ment of new arms. Experience teaches that
it is difficult to cancel deployment once
systems have been issued to the forces.
Instead of that, we should make every
political effort to equalize regional
imbalances. Only when this does not
succeed must— and shall—we react in the
defense and political spheres. In other
words, we do not want to arm in order
to disarm. 165
Horst Ehmke was of the same opinion as Pawelczyk. In a
round table discussion with leaders of the CDU and FDP on Bonn
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television in February, Ehmke had said that the Federal Repub-
lic should first seek negotiated Euro-strategic arms levels
with the Soviet Union. "Should they prove abortive, one
would then have to consider how to balance Soviet superiority
16 6in medium-range missiles."
Ehmke also objected to the form modernized LRTNF would
take. He did not like GLCM or Pershing 2 based in West Germany,
Instead, he thought it might be better to have NATO medium
range nuclear weapons based in submarines. This idea, he
noted during the LRTNF debate in the Bundestag, had been put
forward by Theo Sommer and Christoph Bertram. He said,
The advantage of ground launched medium
range missiles is that they are more
accurate than missiles based on sub-
marines. On the other hand the SS-20
because it is mobile cannot be hit
anyway. At the same time the vulner-
ability of medium range missiles to a




The disarmament wing of the SPD thus wanted the threat of
LRTNF only to force the Soviet Union to the bargaining table.
As a result, little consideration was given to what kind of
LRTNF would be most useful or how many would be needed in the
military situation confronting NATO. Ehmke seemed to be the
only member of the group that gave the matter any thought at
all. His conclusion was that medium range missiles should
not be based on German soil but rather in the sea. Ehmke seems
to have thought that this would make a Soviet attack on the
Federal Republic less likely.
Ill

The last section of this part will examine the role of the
Schmidt government in the LRTNF debate. Members of the govern-
ment— the coalition of the SPD and FDP parties—were clearly
concerned by the build-up of Soviet arms. They were appre-
hensive about the fact that strategic nuclear parity meant
greater significance for the imbalance in the European theater.
They reacted to this imbalance by advocating negotiations to
reduce theater nuclear arms and by welcoming LRTNF as a means
of strengthening ties between Europe and the strategic forces
of the United States.
The previous part of this paper has already described much
of the Schmidt government's stand on LRTNF. Although the
coalition acknowledged the build-up of weapons by the Soviets,
they found it very difficult to move in the direction of
weapons deployment. It was the domestic political considera-
tion— the pressure from the left wing of the party— that
dominated the moves of the coalition.
The coalition was anxious that the difficulties and failure
of the ERW episode should not be repeated. The government
wanted a decision for LRTNF modernization—although in con-
junction with arms control proposals. Foreign Minister Genscher
told Die Welt in July 1979 that the Alliance would appear to
be directionless and without will if a modernization decision
was not taken within the year. He emphasized that the ERW
fiasco should not recur. He said, "Under no circumstances can
another debate of the type and psychological impact as that
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experienced with the neutron weapon be allowed to occur."
For Genscher the LRTNF decision was both politically and
militarily necessary. He told Die Welt /
The Federal Government is convinced that the
modernization is both militarily and poli-
tically absolutely necessary. This is a
result of the technical obsolescence of our
present weapons systems; it is also a result
of the qualitatively new threat from the
SS 20 and the Backfire; it is finally also
the result of the fact that the question of
the Euro-strategic balance will enter a
new, indeed altered and more significant, ,
figdimension after the conclusion of SALT II.
Hans Apel declared in March 1979 that the Federal Republic
was concerned about the progressive enhancement of the military
potential of the Warsaw Pact. He stated, however, that he did
169
not think peace was in any danger. Apel did believe that
the Soviet Union would move offensively against Europe in the
event of a war. He said in a widely reported interview on
Westdeutscher Rundfunk
,
If we take a look at the firm data... then
we will find that the Soviet Union, the
Warsaw Pact, have more in quantity and
quality than is required for the defense
of their own territories. And in all the
exercises, which we also carry out, the
Soviet Union demonstrates that it will
resort to an offensive strategy in the
event of a military conf ? * r,+- ""
v
:iict."<
At a meeting of Bundeswehr commanders in early May 19 79
on the North Sea island of Borkum, Apel expanded on the
offensive possibilities open to the Soviet Union. Not only
did the threat exist in Europe, he said, but also "We are
watching with concern the global range of Soviet military
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might, because it can threaten our sensitive supply routes
,.171from overseas.
The Soviet Union had also built up its theater nuclear
arsenal, according to Apel:
The Soviet Union has always had medium-
range missiles and we actually never had
an equivalent to put up against them.
This did not pose a problem because these
were siloed missiles. They could be pin-
pointed and, if necessary, neutralized by
our own weapons . Thus , what is new is not
the medium-range missiles but the mobility
the transportability, the capacity of
being reloaded; we do not have anything to
put up against that at the moment. ^'^
Apel also noted that the Backfire bomber added even further
to the increased theater potential of the USSR.
This analysis of Soviet theater forces was supported by
Hans Dietrich Genscher, the Foreign Minister of the Federal
Republic and Chairman of the Free Democrats. In a speech to
the party convention in Munster in April 1979, he said that,
Presently there exists an approximate parity
in intercontinental weapons of the United
States and the Soviet Union. As regards
nuclear weapons in Europe, there still
exists approximate parity on the whole be-
tween NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the cate-
gories of up to a range of 1,000 kilometers.
On the other hand, the East has been def-
initely superior for a long time and to
a clearly increasing degree in the field
of medium range missiles threatening
Europe directly, weapons of a range of
between 1,000 and 5,000 kilometers. 173
Genscher also believed that Soviet intentions were offen-
sively oriented. At the same party congress he stated:
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The policy of the Soviet Union, on the
other hand, is aimed at gaining zones of
influence and exporting its system. This
is in line with the expansive goals pur-
sued by it with any, including military,
means, thereby violating the principle of
detente. . .The policy of supremacy no
longer has a future, though the idea of
safeguarding one's own interests by way , 74
of power politics by no means is dead yet.
Chancellor Schmidt, as has already been mentioned, was
also apprehensive about the growing power of the Soviet Union
in Europe. During the Bundestag debate on LRTNF, however, he
downplayed the problem. Instead of emphasizing that the Soviet
threat was growing, he noted that,
Military balance is not necessarily totally
an arithmetic or mathematical identity
between all forces or weapons. Military
balance must be perceived in far more com-
prehensive terms... I will say it again,
when it comes to the successful securing
of peace, a policy of equality cannot in ,.,,.
any way be reduced to the military dimension.
Thus, during the debate on long range theater nuclear
weapons, Schmidt managed to avoid the issue of whether the
Soviets were superior in medium range weapons. Although some
in the SPD and FDP believed that the Soviets were building
their military power for political purposes, they come to
considerably different conclusions about how to react than
had the CDU/CSU.
In April 1979, after describing the Soviet military threat,
Foreign Minister Genscher told his party,
...not the preservation of military
superiority, rearmament and predominance
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but only peace policy, disarmament,
equivalency, partnership and a just
balancing of interests on the basis
of equality, independence, self-deter-
mination and human rights have a future.
...contradictions on principle are not
being resolved by detente policy, but
it must be aimed at dismantling causes
of conflict, preventing the emergence
of new conflicts and mitigating unavoid-
able conflicts in a peaceful way. °
In other words, the Coalition reacted to the increased
Soviet military threat in Europe by calling for increased
detente and increased arms control negotiations. This was
perhaps in part a response to the demands of the disarmament
wing of the SPD. In order to keep the party together the
government may have refrained somewhat from advocating an
improvement in theater nuclear weapons. The FDP members of
the coalition did not seem to object to the power of the SPD's
left wing. Although they may have had to make concessions on
the LRTNF issue for the sake of SPD unity, their position as
a sort of counter-balance to the disarmament group may have
had other rewards. Certainly, FDP power in the government has
far exceeded that to which it is entitled as a result of its
electoral base. In short, the Schmidt government during the
LRTNF decision-making process can be portrayed as a sort of
balancing act, with Schmidt himself as the fulcrum. The
emphasis on negotiation was more than simply an attempt to
reduce the Soviet European threat in the face of declining
American reliability: it was also an attempt to keep the
government in a stable balance.
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This exercise by the Schmidt government was aided by their
interpretation of the function of nuclear weapons. They viewed
them not so much as battlefield weapons, but as deterrence
enhancers. Hans Apel said in May 1979 that,
All our military preparation is to demon-
strate that the beginning of war will be
the end for all involved, for the attackers
as well as the defenders. Preserving peace
in Europe successfully for 30 years has
meant pointing out to the other side that
every risk he might take would be too high
for him. The same applies to modernizing
nuclear forces in Europe. This moderniza-
tion must visibly demonstrate that using
these arms as a threat and maybe using them
in a selective way would create such a great
risk that it would not be sensible to even
consider it. ^1
According to Chancellor Schmidt it was the policy of deterrence
and detente that had brought peace to Europe. During the
LRTNF debate in the Bundestag, he said,
In spite of the largest stockpile of military
material, Europe is the most secure contin-
ent in the world, if I may be permitted to
exclude Australia. This would in no way
be obvious when one remembers the situation
during the Berlin crisis at the end of the
fifties and the beginning of the sixties...
Europe now actually finds itself with a
proper consciousness of a growing and all-
encompassing mutual security. *-'°
This, then, is the substance of the debate in the Federal
Republic on LRTNF. The CDU/CSU made the most cogent arguments
for deployment of LRTNF. They also, however, seemed afraid
of offending their European allies by advocating the new
weapons too strongly. Thus, they wanted American leadership
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on the matter. The disarmament wing of the SPD believed that
Soviet military strength was exaggerated. They argued that
legitimate Soviet great-power and security interests must be
recognized in the context of detente. They believed that
negotiations on LRTNF would work out an accommodation between
the East and the West. The December 1979 Party Congress even
witnessed statements by the disarmament wing indicating the
hope that LRTNF would never be deployed. Although the govern-
ment seemed to agree to some extent with the CDU/CSU assess-
ment of the Soviet military build-up, it was impelled to move
in the direction of further negotiation rather than deployment
of LRTNF. In short, while the December decision was viewed
on this side of the Atlantic as a resolution to deploy Pershing





The year after the December 1979 LRTNF decision was marked
by declining confidence in detente and the arms control pro-
cess. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the diffi-
culties between workers and the Communist Party in Poland made
19 80 a year in which hopes for continued relaxation between
East and West dimmed. In the winter of 19 80 Christoph Bertram
explained why the climate for arms control had turned frigid:
"Successful arms control requires a favorable international
climate, domestic support, and credible instruments. The
179present situation is lacking all three."
At the time of the NPG meeting in Bod0, Norway on June
4-5, 19 80, prospects for negotiations on LRTNF seemed limited.
The Soviet Union had rejected two offers from NATO—both of
which the Federal Republic had taken an active part in drafting,
While the British and Italians had completed their basing
plans for LRTNF in time for the meeting, the West Germans had
deferred such decisions. They were not prepared to discuss
specifics of LRTNF siting in the Federal Republic.
In spite of the chilled arms control atmosphere, and in
spite of concerns about increased Soviet military capabilities,
the Schmidt government worked hard to establish negotiations
on LRTNF. On June 30 and July 1, Chancellor Schmidt met with
Secretary Brezhnev in Moscow.
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During the visit, Brezhnev adopted a conciliatory tone
In a speech during Schmidt's visit he denied that the Soviet
Union was expanding its theater nuclear forces: on the con-
trary, he said they were declining.
I categorically state that the number of
medium-range nuclear delivery weapons on
the territory of the European portion of
the Soviet Union has not been increased
by even one missile, or one airplane, over
the past ten years... the number of launchers
of medium-range missiles and also the yield
of the nuclear charges of these missiles,
have also been somewhat reduced. The number
of medium-range bombers has also been
reduced. 180
When he returned from Moscow, Schmidt reported that nego-
tiations on LRTNF were likely in the near future. He reported
to the Bundestag that,
At this point, however, General Secretary
Brezhnev submitted a new and constructive
proposal. He stated that the Soviet
Union was prepared to initiate bilateral
talks on LRTNF limitation with the United
States even before the ratification of
SALT II.
In those talks, he said, the LRTNF of
both sides would have to be dealt with
taking into consideration all factors
having a bearing on the strategic situ-
ation in this field. He made it clear
that the so-called forward-based systems
would have to be included. .
.
However, he added that agreements result-
ing from such talks could not, in his
view, enter into force until SALT II
had been ratified and enacted. 181
This 'new and constructive proposal* of Brezhnev's, however,
was not as great a concession as it might appear at first
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Iglance. Although the Soviet position dropped the insistence
that NATO suspend implementation of the December 19 79 decision
before negotiations, the forward based systems issue and the
matter of SALT II ratification were still outstanding.
This epilogue to the ERW and LRTNF debates demonstrates
that the forces at work in West German politics during the ERW
and LRTNF debates continue to influence the course of the
Federal Republic's policy. During the two debates the CDU/CSU
opposition supported production and deployment of both types
of nuclear systems. The left wing of the SPD consistently
opposed both ERW and LRTNF decision. There were, however,
changes in the approach of the Schmidt government on the two
issues. The positions of the various factions in West German
politics will also influence the future course of American
policy on the theater nuclear issue.
The representatives of the CDU/CSU such as Manfred Worner
who commented extensively on the ERW and LRTNF issues have
expressed consistent views over the years of the debate.
Worner has been a strong supporter of both ERW and LRTNF. He
advocates a nuclear capability in Europe that could be used
to fight on the European battlefield. At the same time, he
believes that in-theater nuclear forces should also have the
ability to strike the Soviet Union. In his view, a Soviet
sanctuary should never be allowed in a European war.
Worner and his CDU/CSU colleagues have argued that this
two-pronged approach would enhance deterrence in Europe.
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They believe that the combination of a modernized nuclear
capability against a ground attack as well as the LRTNF
capability against the Soviet Union would be the most credible
deterrent, partly because it might effectively link the
Federal Republic with the strategic nuclear forces of the
United States.
The left wing of the SPD, represented by men such as Egon
Bahr and Herbert Wehner, has also taken a consistent stand
during the ERW and LRTNF debates. They are, however, opposed
to any modernization of theater nuclear weapons. They seem
convinced that the threat from the Soviet Union is not sub-
stantial. Wehner has even contended that deployment of the
SS 20 was a defensive move on the part of the Soviet Union.
They argue that deployment of modernized nuclear weapons would
destroy the gains of detente and restrict the continued flow
of 'human contacts'.
The SPD left wing thus virtually denies the necessity for
any in-theater nuclear capability. Even the SALT agreements
—
which caused the government uneasiness for fear that the
American gurantee had been weakened— seemed to have little
impact on SPD left-wing thinking. They remain opposed to any
form of theater nuclear modernization, even as a tool for
negotiating a theater force balance.
The left-wing argument that theater nuclear force modern-
ization would cause a drop in the political temperature which
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would in turn freeze the development of human contacts has
been important to West German electoral politics. The left
wing SPD belief that reduction of visits between East and
West Germany would harm SPD electoral possibilities was not
without substance. There can be little doubt that voters in
Germany find travel between East and West one of the major
accomplishments of the last ten years. The expectation that
voters would react negatively toward the SPD should detente
fail was therefore not unreasonable.
The Arguments of the SPD left wing gained considerable
support during the SPD congresses in 19 77 and 19 79 during
which the ERW and LRTNF issues were discussed. During both
Parteitagen the left wing introduced resolutions that de-
nounced the introduction of modernized nuclear weapons on the
soil of the Federal Republic. Although these resolutions
were not adopted, they did have considerable influence over
the final form of the resolution on the ERW and LRTNF issues.
This influence of the left-wing was often decisive in the
internal workings of the Party: Wehner headed the commission
that drafted the resolution on LRTNF.
Clearly, therefore, the SPD and FDP members who made up
the government have had to take into account the left wing
of the SPD when policy on ERW and LRTNF was made. Yet the
Schmidt government's approach to the LRTNF problem differed
subtly from its position on ERW. While the Schmidt govern-
ment had maintained a strict public neutrality on ERW, it
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found it easier to publicly support LRTNF. Although it is
likely that Schmidt was in favor of ERW production and deploy-
ment and may have communicated this to President Carter, the
public stand taken by Schmidt was not a strong defense of the
weapon system. In contrast, while Schmidt's government main-
tained that the LRTNF production decision was still up to the
United States, it actively supported the deployment in Europe
of nuclear weapons that could strike the Soviet Union. In
fact, members of the government and Bundestag spoke more and
more frequently of the Soviet threat and the altered theater
balance as a result of SALT.
There are three important reasons for this change in the
government's approach to theater nuclear force modernization.
First, the manner in which the issue was brought into public
debate and the coupling of the modernization proposal with an
arms control proposal. Second, the failure of ERW made it
important to come to some agreement on LRTNF. Finally, the
LRTNF seemed to the West German government to re-inforce the
link between Europe and the strategic forces of the United
States more explicitly than did ERW. In fact, ERW could be
portrayed as likely to de-couple the American strategic nu-
clear guarantee.
Enhanced radiation warhead technology had been available
for nearly two decades before it became the subject of public
debate. Contrary to the pronouncements of some American
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Senators, it was in fact discussed in NATO military councils
and within both the West German and U.S. governments. When
the story broke in the press in the spring of 19 77, however,
neither the government of the Federal Republic nor the Carter
Administration was prepared for the controversy it created.
Carter was unable to elicit from European allies what he con-
sidered sufficient support. In part because of the speed with
which events moved and in part because of Carter's inflexibility,
Schmidt was unable to forge a compromise within his party that
would allow him to advocate ERW openly.
The LRTNF decision developed much more slowly than had
that on ERW. Intense examination of the issues took place in
NATO, in the Bundestag and other government circles over the
course of several years. The long-term negotiations and con-
sultations that took place between allies and within govern-
ments and parties on the issue made crucial compromises possible.
While the fore-shortened time-scale in which the ERW issue was
debated made it difficult for the Federal Republic to adopt
anything other than a neutral stance, the longer period of
the LRTNF debate gave the slow wheels of government the
opportunity to turn.
One of the most important of these compromises was the
combining of arms control proposals with the modernization
package. This was, of course, not merely for the benefit of
the left-wing of the SPD: other NATO European nations also
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have to contend with a noisy anti-nuclear lobby. The combin-
ation of nuclear modernization with an arms control effort,
along with the government's emphasis on increased Soviet
threat, served the interests of the SPD left wing while
allowing modernization to proceed.
At the same time, the failure of the United States to
produce ERW and the failure of the Federal Republic and other
NATO allies to agree to deploy the weapon, increased the pol-
itical necessity for an agreement on LRTNF. Foreign Minister
Hans-Dietrich Genscher felt especially keenly the pressure
for a alliance-wide decision on LRTNF. In other words, the
ERW failure had made it all the more important that an LRTNF
agreement be reached and modernization occur. Without such
a decision, the ability of the Alliance to act in concert
on difficult issues—indeed even the ability of the Alliance
to maintain an effective military organization—would be open
to serious question. In other words, the ERW failure itself
had an important influence over the atmosphere in which nego-
tiations on LRTNF took place. Leaders in the West German
government felt more pressure to establish an agreement on
LRTNF than they had on ERW.
Finally, the nature of the weapons themselves also in-
fluenced the actions of the SPD-FDP government. Since his
speech to the IISS in London in October 19 77, Schmidt had
been publicly concerned with the growth of Soviet "Euro-stra-
tegic" power. He contended that SALT - in equalizing central
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strategic forces - increased the relative advantage of the
Soviet Union in Europe, since the United States had always
committed such strategic forces to the defense of Europe.
Schmidt's concern with the possible loss of the American
strategic umbrella apparently made him more interested in
LRTNF than ERW. While ERW provided an effective capability
on the European battlefield—and thus might contribute to
deterrence in Europe— they could not alter the impact of SALT
on the Euro- strategic nuclear balance. LRTNF, on the other
hand, with their ability to strike the Soviet homeland, would
help to reduce what might from a West German perspective be
an unfavorable impact of SALT. LRTNF would also help to forge
a stronger link between the forces in Europe and the American
strategic nuclear arsenal. Deployment of LRTNF in Europe
would mean that a nuclear war would be more difficult to con-
fine to the continent. Schmidt seems to have considered this
linkage a more powerful deterrent than a battlefield nuclear
capability.
The response of the government of the Federal Republic to
LRTNF, then, was at least in part motivated by strategic devel-
opments outside of West Germany. The particular form of the
response to LRTNF as well as to ERW was dominated by internal
political factors. Those internal political factors dictate
that an SPD-FDP coalition government cannot support theater
nuclear modernization outside of an arms control context.
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Fundamental modernization cannot be pursued without serious
efforts at arms control as well. Thus, Schmidt was politically
required to travel to Moscow if he wanted to see the deployment
of LRTNF.
These enduring factors in West German party politics
clearly have important implications for future American policy
on nuclear modernization in Europe. Chancellor Schmidt's room
for maneuver has been further reduced as a result of SPD left-
wing success in the October 1980 elections. This means that
American policy-makers cannot expect West German leaders of
this party coalition (SPD-FDP) to publicly support theater
nuclear modernization simply because such modernization might
be militarily desirable on either the strategic or tactical
level. The response is likely to be similar to that given to
ERW that is, unwillingness to take a supportive position pub-
licly unless or until the decision can be taken in an alliance-
wide context and in an arms control context. The framework
developed during the LRTNF episode therefore seems to provide
a system that is as effective as is presently possible. If
this is indeed the case, the United States can not expect rapid
movement by West Germany on actual deployment of any land-based
theater nuclear weapons.
In February 19 80, Theo Sommer wrote in Die Zeit that
"watchful waiting should be sufficient response to the
invasion of Afghanistan." Even after the Polish crisis it
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is likely that decision makers both within the SPD and in the
government of the Federal Republic will want to continue the
watch. They are unlikely to want to introduce new proposals
for theater nuclear weapons; they are even unlikely to want
to prepare substantially for the deployment of the LRTNF on
which NATO has already agreed.
In order to overcome this reluctance, it has been suggested
that weapons systems other than land-based types be introduced
to Europe. It has been suggested that such systems would not
only be less vulnerable but also politically more acceptable
since they would not provide a target on the territory of the
Federal Republic itself.
While it is far beyond the scope of this paper to examine
the technical merits of such systems, it seems clear from the
two episodes examined here that such a solution would not
escape the difficulties encountered by ERW and LRTNF. Agree-
ments to deploy any sort of theater nuclear weapons will have
to be accompanied by arms control proposals. Negotiations
comparable to SALT will have to take place before deployment.
Even fears that SALT has made the United States less reliable
and even the shocks detente has received are unlikely to sub-
stantially change the political equation in the Federal
Republic.
In short, the left wing of the SPD found it impossible
to support any form of nuclear modernization in Europe, while
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the CDU/CSU opposition regularly called for improved nuclear
capabilities. The CDU/CSU supported the modernization of
both battlefield nuclear weapons and weapons systems capable
of striking the Soviet Union. The coalition government under
Schmidt found it easier to support LRTNF than ERW. This sup-
port for LRTNF came at least in part because the coalition
feared that SALT had altered the nuclear balance in Europe
and made the American connection less secure. At the same
time, however, the position of the government was constrained
by significant forces in the left wing of the party. The SPD
left made it difficult for the government to support any form
of nuclear modernization. The compromise established in the
SPD allowed the government to support nuclear modernization
only if arms control efforts were pursued concurrently.
The October 19 80 elections returned the SPD-FDP govern-
ment to power and ensured a continuation of the political
situation outlined here. Chancellor Schmidt will be faced
with a left wing in his own party that has been and may be
increasingly difficult to control. In the meantime the CDU/
CSU opposition since the crises in Afghanistan and Poland
—
and increased tensions between East and West Germany—has
become convinced that detente in Europe has come to an end.
It may, therefore, be ever more difficult for Schmidt to
continue the compromise on LRTNF or to effect new compromises
on equally divisive issues.
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